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I. THE PROBLEM 
Each society that respects basic values determines the position of 
freedom of expression in relation to other freedoms according to its 
own history, institutions, sense of security, and tolerance of dissent. 
Although in the United States the reach of freedom of expression has 
not been static, the contemporary Supreme Court speaks of this free-
dom in almost absolute terms and attributes to it a commanding prior-
ity over other competing liberties. 1 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) 
guarantees freedom of opinion and speech but makes it expressly sub-
ject to limitations defined in "the general laws, the provisions of law 
for the protection of youth, and by the right to inviolability of personal 
honour."2 The experience with the abuse of freedoms that contributed 
1. In the United States the contemporary view points heavily in the direction of the unconsti· 
tutionality of restraints on racial hatred speech. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); 
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of Skokie v. 
National Socialist Party of America, 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978) (neo-Nazis allowed to 
march through a section inhabited largely by survivors of the holocaust). However, "[a]s long as 
Beauharnois [Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)) exists, at least, the law must be taken 
to be somewhat unsettled." Bollinger, The Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an "Easy Case" and 
Free Speech Theory, 80 MICH. L. REV. 617, 621 (1982). Beauharnois confirmed the constitu· 
tional validity of group defamation laws. But cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See 
generally L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST 
SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986). 
2. GRUNDGESETZ [GG) art. 5(2) (English translation from THE BASIC LAW OF THE FED· 
ERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany 1977)). On the concept of "general laws," see Starck, Herkunft u11d 
E11twicklung der K/ausel "a/lgemeine Gesetze" als Sclzra11ke der Kommu11ikationsfreilzeite11 111 
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to the demise of the Weimar Republic and the suppression of these 
freedoms by the National Socialist regime left a deep imprint upon the 
Basic Law and subsequent legislation:3 the democratic, pluralist sys-
tem with an elaborate bill of rights, established by the Basic Law in 
abhorrence of the totalitarian past, was to be secured against those 
who would invoke the protection of basic rights as a cover for attack-
ing the constitutional order,4 and all Germans were given the right of 
resistance - in the absence of other remedies - against anyone who 
attempted to overthrow that order.5 The doctrine evolved by the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court postulates a community employing the law 
in the defense of the Basic Law's political values: free speech claims 
must be weighed against the values of human dignity and personal 
honor that are grounded in the Basic Law itself. 6 
The Criminal Code, a prime example of the "general laws" by 
which certain basic freedoms may be limited, contains far-reaching 
provisions outlawing political organizations and activities hostile to 
the Basic Law - including public speech and writings - which 
would hardly stand up to constitutional scrutiny in American courts. 
The postwar resurgence of neo-Nazi activities has led to legislative re-
forms designed to strengthen these provisions still further. Left-ex-
tremist terrorism and propaganda, abetted by the uneasy propinquity 
of the totalitarian empire, have also served as the basis for legal 
countermeasures. 
The latest reform of the Criminal Code, the law of June 13, 1985,7 
first proposed in 1982 in the face of a rise of neo-Nazi incidents,8 was 
Artikel 5 Abs. 2 des Grundgesetzes, in IM DIENST AN RECHT UND STAAT 189 (H. Schneider & V. 
Gotz eds. 1974). This approach is neither novel nor specifically German; it is comparable to 
other European constitutions. See, e.g., DENMARK CONST. of 1953, art. 77, in 4 G. BLAUSTEIN, 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 24 (Feb. 1985); NETHERLANDS CONST. 
art. 7 (amended 1983), in 11 id. at 4 (Jan. 1984); SPAIN CONST. art. 20 (1978), in 14 id. at 5 (Oct. 
1979); [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
art. 10, in L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 125, 129 (1973); American Convention on Human Rights, art. 13, in id. at 
209, 214-15. 
3. Bubnolf, Die strafrechtliche Bekiimpfung rechts-extremistischer Aktivitiiten, 1982 ZEIT· 
SCHRIFf FOR RECHTSPOLITIK 118, 120. 
4. GG art. 18. 
5. GG art. 20(4); see also, e.g., GG art. 9(2) (prohibition of associations directed against the 
constitutional order); art. 21(2) (unconstitutionality of political parties directed against the basic 
democratic order); art. 5(3) (obligation ofloyalty of university teachers toward the constitution). 
According to Steinberger, this form of a "militant" democracy which is capable of protecting 
itself is unique among modern democratic constitutions. H. STEINBERGER, KONZEPTION UND 
GRENZEN FREIHEITLICHER DEMOKRATIE 8-9 (1974). 
6. Kommers, The Jurisprudence of Free Speech in the United States and the Federal Republic 
of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 693 (1980) (with citations to case law). 
7. Einundzwanzigstes Strafrechtsiinderungsgesetz, 1985 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I 965. 
8. See Schmude, Aufgaben und Grenzen des Strafrechts im Kampf gegen Neonazismus, 1981 
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motivated primarily by the perceived need to facilitate prosecution of 
an increasingly employed propaganda theme, the so-called "Ausch-
witz lie" - the claim that the extermination of European Jews by the 
National Socialist regime never took place, that such reports were a 
deliberate lie. 
This theme has become an aspect of multifarious efforts to revise 
the history of the National Socialist regime in the service of diverse 
and often contradictory ideologies: antisemitism of the neo-Nazi hue, 
anticommunism of the extreme conservative right, anti-Zionism, Ger-
man nationalism and varied nationalisms in the Eastern European 
countries, libertarian pacifism, and Marxism of the extreme left. 9 
A French scholar who has surveyed the proliferation of tracts, 
"scholarly" and outright propaganda books, brochures, mimeo-
graphed pamphlets, video-cassettes, and periodicals with or without 
scholarly pretensions, suggests that it would be an exaggeration to 
speak of "a vast international enterprise," although "undoubtedly" the 
center for the collection and distribution of all this literature is located 
in California.10 Only in France have the "revisionists" obtained access 
to respectable press and managed to entangle academic historians in a 
"debate."11 More or less obscure individuals or groups are active in 
Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Swe-
den, as well as in the German Federal Republic. 12 
RECHT UND PoLITIK 153, 154-55 (explanation of proposed legislation by Minister of Justice); see 
also text at notes 98-99 infra. 
9. This section relies on Professor Pierre Vidal-Naquet of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en 
Sciences Sociales in Paris. See P. VIDAL-NAQUET, LES JUIFS, LA MEMOIRE ET LE PREsENT 195-
279 (1981); Vidal-Naquet, Theses sur le revisionnisme, in L' ALLEMAGNE NAZIE ET LE GENOCIDE 
JUIF 496, 501-06 (1985). The statement in the text is from id. at 502. 
10. Vidal-Naquet, Theses sur le revisionnisme, supra note 9, at 501. 
11. See Vidal-Naquet, Theses sur le rivisionnisme, supra note 9, at 505; see also note 55 infra. 
In June 1985, the University of Nantes awarded a doctorate to Henri Roques, a 65-year-old 
agronomist, for a 371-page thesis that asserted there was no firm evidence to prove that the Nazis 
had gassed prisoners in concentration camps. The paper, which received special honors, pro-
voked a storm of protests. The French government ordered that the doctorate be withdrawn 
because of improprieties in the examining process, and that the head of the examining board be 
suspended. See Miller, Frenchman Assailed for Denying Nazi Crimes, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1986, 
at 4, col. 1; France Revokes Thesis That Denies Nazi Acts, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1986, at 2, col. 2. 
In Germany, the doctorate of a seventy-year-old former judge of a Hamburg court was revoked 
in 1983 by the president of the University of Gottingen on the ground that the judge had au-
thored a book entitled The Auschwitz Myth - Legend or Reality, in which he questioned the 
death of six million Jews. The Administrative Court of Braunschweig upheld the president's 
action. Der Tagesspiegel (Berlin), Jan. 31, 1986, at 7, col. 1. A Swiss high school teacher and 
military judge in the Swiss army who questioned the existence of World War II Nazi gas cham-
bers in public statements, news conferences, and right-wing newspapers edited by her husband 
has been formally barred from teaching history (but would be able to teach French). Swiss 
Doubter of Nazi Camps Is Forbidden to Teach History, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1987, at 10, col. 3. 
12. In Sweden, an Austrian-born Jehovah's Witness publishes a periodical and organizes 
summer trips to Auschwitz and to other localities in Poland to demonstrate that "nothing serious 
had taken place there." In Australia, it is the former secretary of the Victorian Council for Civil 
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An American observer would expect the central issue in the public 
debate to be the conflict between the constitutionally protected values 
of individual freedom of expression on the one hand and public secur-
ity and personal honor on the other. This, however, has not been the 
case. To the contrary, the constitutional issue has played a marginal 
role in the legislative process, and it has been resolved by the courts 
with obvious ease in favor of the constitutionality of the previous legis-
lation on the same general subject. There is every reason to believe 
that the new law will also be upheld, even though, as we shall see, it 
potentially restricts freedom of speech still further. Moreover, it has 
been widely assumed (albeit with some dissent) that law and the courts 
have a significant role in protecting against the infamous and the igno-
rant who propagate the "Auschwitz lie." The core issue in public dis-
course has been the scope and the modalities of this contribution. 
In this essay I propose, first, to outline the state of the legislation 
before the enactment of the new law; second, to illustrate the travail of 
the courts in applying that legislation; third, to identify the principal 
legal and political issues that have emerged in the wide-ranging debate 
surrounding the genesis of the new law and in the lawmaking process 
itself; and fourth, to consider early reactions to the law and its implica-
tions in the broader context of contemporary Germany. 
II. THE CRIMINAL CODE 
Three provisions of the German Criminal Code13 are crucial to 
this inquiry. The first two, articles 130 and 131, fall within the group 
of serious crimes against "public peace." 
Liberties, in Italy a "small libertarian and Marxist group." Vidal-Naquet, Theses sur le rivision-
nisme, supra note 9, at 504-05. In the United States a survivor of the Auschwitz camp sued the 
Legion for Survival of Freedom and its subsidiaries, including the Institute for Historical Review 
and Liberty Lobby, claiming that they reneged on an offer to pay $50,000 to any person who 
offered proof that millions of Jews had been gassed by National Socialists. The plaintiff de-
manded the payment of the prize and damages. In a settlement approved by the Los Angeles 
Superior Court, the defendants agreed to pay the $50,000 prize and $50,000 damages for emo-
tional distress and libel and to offer a formal apology acknowledging the judicial recognition that 
Jews were gassed to death in Auschwitz in the summer of 1944. L.A. Times, July 25, 1985, at 1, 
col. 1. The same plaintiff also sued a Swedish citizen in the Los Angeles court on the ground that 
he had been emotionally tortured by the defendant's assertions that the holocaust was a fiction. 
The jury awarded the plaintiff $500,000 in compensatory damages and $4.75 million in punitive 
damages for libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendant did not answer 
the complaint and was not represented in court, but the plaintiff's attorneys are reported as 
hoping to have the default judgment enforced in Sweden. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1986, at 7, col. 4. 
On an American "expert," see note 55 infra. 
13. Translations from the German original, STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB], are my own. For 
an English translation of the entire Criminal Code as of April 1, 1961, see THE GERMAN PENAL 
CODE OF 1871 (G. Mueller & T. Buergenthal trans. 1961). 
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A. Attack on Human Dignity by Incitement to Hate: Article 130 
Article 130 replaced a provision of the Criminal Code of the Ger-
man Empire which penalized breach of the peace (public order) by 
incitement to class hatred. I4 Its antecedent was a proposal offered in 
1950 by the Social Democratic group in Parliament in response to a 
series of antisemitic incidents including increased circulation of an-
tisemitic tracts. An earlier version of the governmental bill was op-
posed on constitutional and policy grounds, and it was put aside until 
a new wave of desecration of synagogues and cemeteries in 1959 had 
brought about a radical change in the legislative atmosphere. The out-
come of the notorious Nieland case in Hamburg was the last straw, 
which helped to sweep away all arguments that new legislation was 
neither necessary nor desirable. Is 
In that case Nieland, a Hamburg businessman, distributed two 
thousand copies of a brochure primarily among federal politicians. 
The brochure stated that "international Jewry" ("the devils of the 
earth") was responsible for the two World Wars (financing Hitler), for 
planning the third, and for spreading the "monstrous lie of a butchery 
of the six million Jews by the Germans under Hitler." All Jews, it 
said, must be removed from positions of influence since it was "almost 
impossible" to look into the Jewish hearts in order to determine which 
ones belong to "international Jewry." The defendant was charged 
under the then-existing provision of the Criminal Code prohibiting 
dissemination of writings hostile to the Basic Law. I6 In addition, a 
Jewish member of the Hamburg state legislature filed a petition for 
prosecution of a criminal libel ("insult") under article 185.I7 
The trial court refused to institute the proceeding on the ground 
that it was not possible to disprove the defendant's allegation that his 
target was not "Jews in general" but only the "clique" of "interna-
tional Jewry." The private petition was also rejected because there 
14. See STGB art. 130 (1871). For an English translation, see THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE 
GERMAN EMPIRE 221 (G. Drage trans. 1885). 
15. For a detailed history, see G. Krone, Die Volksverhetzung als Verbrechen gegen die 
Menschlichkeit 1-54 (dissertation, Johannes-Gutenberg-Universitiit Mainz, Law & Economics 
Dept., 1979); see also Schafheutle, Das sechste Strafrechtsiinderungsgesetz, 15 JURISTENZEITUNG 
[JZ] 470, 470-72 (1960); P. Paepcke, Antisemitismus und Strafrecht 164 (dissertation, Albert· 
Ludwigs-Universitiit Freiburg i. Br., 1962). See generally Cobler, Das Gesetz gegen die "Ausch-
witz-Luge'~· Anmerkungen zu einem rechtspolitischen Ablasshandel 18 KRJTISCHE Jurnz 159 
(1985). 
16. Article 93 made punishable by imprisonment the production, stocking, and dissemina-
tion of writings aimed at the impairment of the existence of the Federal Republic or the suppres-
sion of democratic freedoms. STRAFGESETZBUCH art. 93 (1953). Article 93 was abrogated by a 
later law. 
17. The German term is Beleidigung. Article 185 of the Criminal Code is the last of the 
three provisions mentioned above. It is discussed in the text at notes 38-45 infra. 
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was no evidence that the petitioner was a member of the "closely cir-
cumscribed circle of Jews (international Jewry)." 18 The state appeals 
court rejected the Chief Prosecutor's urgent complaint without 
explanation.19 
Although it was beyond the Federal Supreme Court's power to 
order the opening of the prosecution, that court did approve, in a sepa-
rate proceeding, the seizure of the remaining copies of the brochure -
and in an elaborate opinion it reached conclusions diametrically oppo-
site those of the Hamburg courts. It found that the tract was contrary 
to the prohibition against writings designed to impair the existence of 
the Republic and to suppress democratic freedoms by undermining 
basic constitutional principles. 20 The reasoning, if not the decision, of 
the Hamburg judiciary is said to have evoked "much astonishment, 
even disgust."21 The mayor of the city of Hamburg is reported to have 
traveled to Bonn to appeal to Chancellor Adenauer, and it was the 
latter's intervention that led to the prompt adoption of the new article 
130 on May 20, 1960, by a unanimous Parliament.22 
The motivating idea behind article 130 was the feeling that 
although the courts in most cases were able to impose punishment 
under the prevailing law (and that they should have done so in the 
Nieland case), that law did not "strike at the core of the evil ... , that 
is, the attack on humanity, human dignity, and general public 
peace."23 Thus, rather than aiming at the protection of private 'indi-
vidual or group honor, which is assured by the criminal libel ("insult") 
provision, the new criminal provision is motivated by the public inter-
est in safeguarding public peace. 24 
18. Decision of Nov. 26, 1958, Landgericht Hamburg, 14 JZ 176 (1959). 
19. See 14 JZ 176-78 (1959) (complaint by the Chief Prosecutor against the decision below, 
Az. 14a Js 236/57; brief of the State Prosecutor General, Az. 2 OAR 801/58; decision of June 1, 
1959, Hans. Oberlandesgericht [OLG] Hamburg, Ws 724/58). 
20. Judgment of Feb. 28, 1959, 13 Bundesgerichtshofin Strafsachen [BGHSt] 32. The court 
applied the original article 93. See note 16 supra. 
21. Kiister, Anmerkung zum vorstehenden Beschluss des OLG Hamburg, 14 JZ 178, 179 
(1959). 
22. See G. Krone, supra note 15, at 32-33. 
23. Schafheutle, supra note 15, at 471. The author was an official of the Ministry of Justice 
which drafted the law. For the text of article 130, see the Appendix to this essay. 
24. On the concept of "public peace" in this context, see E. DREHER & H. TRONDLE, 
STRAFGESETZBUCH UND NEBENGESETZE, art. 130, no. 2 (42d ed. 1985); see also N. ANDROU-
LAKIS, DIE SAMMELBELEIDIGUNG 99-100 (1970). See, most recently, decision of Mar. 25, 1985, 
OLG Munich, 40 JZ 807, 807-08 (1985) (citations omitted): 
The protected good in Criminal Code art. 130 ... is the public peace (unanimous view). But 
it is disputed whether the dignity of the individual is an added protected good .... 
• . . A member of a religious community or of a part of the population, however, is not 
directly injured by an attack such as the incriminating statement in this case because he is 
not a carrier of the public peace; only the community organized in the state is the carrier. 
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Article 130 introduces the concept of human dignity which is also 
enshrined in the Basic Law of the Republic.25 It prohibits attacks 
against human dignity "apt to breach the public peace," committed in 
the form of acts of "particular gravity"26 against "parts of the popula-
tion. "27 The proscribed acts consist of (1) incitement to hatred ("stir-
ring up enmity in an invasive manner, beyond mere rejection or 
contempt"); (2) provocation to violent or arbitrary acts (that is, acts of 
violence or lawlessness against personal freedom);28 and (3) insult, rid-
icule, and defamation (not just "mere expression of disrespect" or 
"disparaging assertions whose truth or untruth cannot be proven").29 
When requested to elucidate the concept of "attack on human dig-
nity," the Justice Ministry's spokesman drew an analogy with the es-
tablished doctrine ·on degrading treatment of subordinates in the 
25. See GG art. 1(1): "The dignity of man shall be inviolable.'' Moreover, "[t]his inviolabil· 
ity of human dignity is not a mere programmatic statement but a 'directly effective norm of the 
objective (constitutional) law •.. .' " Judgment of Feb. 28, 1959, 13 BGHSt 32, 35 (citing 1 H. v. 
MANGOLDT & F. KLEIN, DAS BONNER GRUNDGESETZ 147 (2d ed. 1955)). 
26. Schafheutle, supra note 15, at 473. 
27. The enumeration of the protected groups contained in the earlier versions ("a national, 
racial, religious, or ethnic group") followed article 220a of the Criminal Code, implementing the 
Genocide Convention. G. Krone, supra note 15, at 35. This formulation was replaced by the 
neutral "parts of the population" in response primarily to the concern expressed by the Central 
Council of the Jews in Germany lest the text create a privi/egium odiosum for the Jews. The 
Jewish group ultimately approved the final text. Id. at 37; P. Paepcke, supra note 15, at 168 n.1. 
On its face "parts of the population" could be read as including political, social, and eco-
nomic groups, but such potentially unconstitutional application is precluded, it is said, by the 
requirement that the act must constitute an attack on human dignity. Id. at 164-65. 
The first legislation against racial hatred was the Law of the State of Bavaria of March 13, 
1946, 3 Bereinigte Sammlung des bayerischen Landesrechts 1802-1956, at 149 (1957). This law 
was expressly preempted by the new article 130. Schafheutle, supra note 15, at 473. See in this 
context article 20(2) of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
of 1966 (in force 1976), providing that "advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law." 21 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178. Sec also 
article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (in force 
1969), requiring prohibition of advocacy of racial hatred and incitement to racial discrimination 
and violence. 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 218. There is no corresponding provision in the European 
Convention on Human Rights. But see Resolution of the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe on Measures to be Taken Against Incitement to Racial, National, and Religious Ha-
tred, Res. 68 (30) of Oct. 31, 1968, 1968 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 94 (Eur. Commn. on 
Hum. Rts.); the model law defining the offense of incitement to hatred adopted by the Consulta· 
tive Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 453 on Measures to be Taken Against 
Incitement to Racial, National and Religious Hatred, Eur. Consult. Ass., 17th Sess. (Texts 
Adopted by the Assembly) (1966). See generally Lerner, International Definitions of l11citeme11t 
to Racial Hatred, 14 N.Y.L.F. 49 (1968). 
28. Cf STGB arts. 234a, 241. [All STGB citations are to the current code, unless otherwise 
indicated.] 
29. The statements in parentheses are by Schatbeutle, supra note IS, at 473. For definitions 
of the terms "insult," "ridicule," and "defamation," see E. DREHER & H. TRC>NDLE, supra note 
24, art. 130, no. 7. It has been suggested that the constitutionally protected freedom of opinion 
precludes penalization of any of the above acts except those that incite to violence or lawlessness. 
N. ANDROULAKIS, supra note 24, at 96. 
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Military Criminal Law (Wehrstrafgesetz): article 130 would reach 
"not any expression of disrespect," but only an attack "on the core 
area of [the victim's] personality,,, a denial of the victim's "right to life 
as an equal in the community," or his treatment as "an inferior being 
excluded from the protection of the constitution."30 
One writer questions the analogy between degrading treatment of a 
soldier, which envisages a personal confrontation, and the attack on 
human dignity; he believes that such an attack can exist only in cases 
of incitement to violence or lawlessness. But he "would not hesitate for 
a moment" to brand statements such as "Jews are inferior beings 
(Untermenschen )" as an attack on human dignity; because of the "un-
avoidable connection with the cruel persecution of Jews ... it is noth-
ing less than an endorsement of the call for a revival of the terrible 
extermination .... "31 
B. Race-Hatred Writings: Article 131 
Article 131, also within the category of crimes against public 
peace, is said to be "almost without parallel in foreign legislation."32 
Its reach was substantially broadened in 1973.33 The clause that con-
cerns us here makes punishable the production or dissemination of 
writings "which incite to racial hatred."34 Reports on contemporary 
events or history are protected by an express exclusion. 35 As in the 
previous article, it is "the inner peace of the society" that is pro-
tected;36 the clause in question is directed "primarily at the incitement 
30. Dr. Schafheutle, Ministerialdirektor, before the 99th Session of the Legal Committee of 
the German Bundestag, Mar. 17, 1960, quoted in G. Krone, supra note 15, at 51-53 (emphasis 
added); see also Schafheutle, supra note 15, at 473: "Jews out" or "Negro half-breeds living in 
Germany should be gassed" would qualify as attacks under article 130. 
31. N. ANDROULAKIS,_supra note 24, at 96-97. The penalty for violating article 130 is im-
prisonment for three months to five years or a fine. See also STGB art. 47(2) (amount of fines). 
Today more than 83% of all sentences rendered by German courts impose fines rather than 
imprisonment. See E. DREHER & H. TRONDLE, supra note 24, art. 40, no. 1. 
32. E. DREHER & H. TRONDLE, supra note 24, art. 131, no. I; see also A. SCHONKE & H. 
SCHRODER, STRAFGESETZBUCH KOMMENTAR, art. 131, no. 1 (21st ed. 1982). For the text of 
article 131 see the Appendix to this essay. 
33. The concept of "race hatred" was taken from article 112 of the Law Against Writings 
Endangering Youth of June 9, 1953. Judgment of Oct. 28, 1980, OLG Cologne, 34 NEUE JURIS-
TISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1280, 1281 (1981). 
34. Also included in the prohibition are writings which "describe cruel or otherwise inhuman 
acts of violence against humans in a manner which glorifies or minimizes such acts of violence or 
represents the cruel or inhuman aspects of the occurrence in a manner offending human dignity." 
The forms of dissemination (including broadcasting) are defined in para. 1(1)-(4) and in para. 2. 
A critical note is Gehrhardt, Die Beschriinkung der Gesetzgebung auf das Unerliissliche, 28 NJW 
375 (1975). 
35. STGB art. 131(3). The penalty is imprisonment up to one year or a fine. 
36. E. DREHER & H. TRONDLE, supra note 24, art. 131, no. 1. 
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of hatred against Jews."37 
C. ''Insult'~· Article 185 
The third of the triad, article 185, has been a part of the Criminal 
Code from its inception. It makes punishable an offense against per-
sonal honor, "insult."38 Proof of the truth is no defense "when the 
insult arises from the manner in which the assertion was made or dis-
seminated or the circumstances in which it was made."39 Until the 
modification brought about by the 1985 law, prosecution could be in-
stituted only on the basis of a petition "by the person insulted."40 
In the period between the coming into force of the Criminal Code 
in 1871 and the fateful year of 1945, the German Supreme Court 
(Reichsgericht) consistently refused to apply this article to insults 
against Jews as a group41 - although it gave the benefit of its protec-
tion to such groups as "Germans living in Prussian provinces, large 
landowners, all Christian clerics, German officers, and Prussian troops 
who fought in Belgium and Northern France."42 It has been said that 
during that period the courts were quite ready to extend group protec-
tion to the "pillars of the throne and the altar," while denying it to the 
Jews on the basis of an "often suspect argumentation."43 A more 
charitable interpretation would point to the avid desire of many Ger-
man Jews to shed the characteristics that would mark them as a group 
and to be assimilated as rapidly as possible. The "hopefully uncon-
scious onesidedness"44 of the Supreme Court vanished, as we shall see, 
37. Id. at art. 131, no. 6. Another commentary suggests, however, that in contrast to article 
130 the incitement to race hatred need not be such as to potentially disturb public peace, and that 
races that do not form "a part of the internal population" are also protected. A. SCHONKE & H. 
SCHRODER, supra note 32, art. 131, no. 3. In the same commentary it is said, however, that the 
"legal good" protected is "ultimately here also public peace." Id. at art. 131, no. 1. 
38. This offense is punishable by imprisonment of up to one year or by a fine, but when it is 
committed by a physical act (Tiit/ichkeit) the punishment is up to two years of imprisonment or a 
fine. See also STGB arts. 186 (damage to reputation consisting of factual statements insulting a 
third person), 187 (defamation), 187a (persons in political life), 189 (disparaging the memory of 
the dead). For the text of article 185 see the Appendix to this essay. 
39. STGB art. 192. 
40. In case of the death of the offended person, the right of petition passes to his family -
and if he or she died as a result of a "violent or arbitrary dominance" (Gewalt- und Willkilrherr-
schaft), to which the insult is related, the requirement of a petition is dispensed with. STGB art. 
194(1)-(2). 
41. See P. Paepcke, supra note 15, at 81-87, 92; N. ANDROULAKIS, supra note 24, at 12-23 
(citing the relevant case law). German law distinguishes between insult of a group and insult of 
individuals by statements directed against a group. See A. SCHONKE & H. SCHRODER, supra note 
32, Vorbemerkungen 3-8 to arts. 185-200. 
42. P. Paepcke, supra note 15, at 86. 
43. N. ANDROULAKIS, supra note 24, at 32-33. 
44. P. Paepcke, supra note 15, at 92. 
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after 1945.45 
In summary, the principal instrumentalities in the criminal-law ar-
mory against the spreading of the "Auschwitz lie" consist of the 
prohibitions against attacks on human dignity by incitement to hatred 
(article 130) and against dissemination of writings instigating hatred 
(article 131), both conceived as serious offenses against the public 
peace, and finally, the less weighty offense of insult, protecting primar-
ily a private good which - until the 1985 reform - required a private 
petition. 
III. ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION 
The Federal Constitutional Court, the only tribunal that may de-
clare a federal law unconstitutional, was faced with a challenge to the 
constitutionality of articles 130 and 131 in a case in which a defendant, 
a member of the "Action Front of the National Socialists (ANS)," was 
convicted for taking part in an event organized by this group in the 
center ofHamburg.46 The group was dressed in Nazi-type black cloth-
ing with Nazi paraphernalia, and it marched in military formation 
with Nazi salutes. Three members of the group carried signs which 
read: "I, a donkey, still believe that Jews were 'gassed' in German 
concentration camps. I, a donkey, believe the 'gassing' lies and want 
to pay, pay, pay to Israel. I, a donkey, still believe the propaganda lies 
of the 'victors.' " The courts below found the defendant guilty of an 
attack on human dignity in conjunction with incitement to race 
hatred. 
In a preliminary proceeding, the screening committee of the Con-
stitutional Court refused to accept the defendant's complaint of un-
constitutionality on the ground that it had no prospect of success, 
since the "interpretation and application of articles 130 and 131 by the 
competent courts did not disclose any violation of basic freedoms."47 
The court also rejected the "due process" claim that the courts had 
disregarded the complainant's offers of evidence: 
The complainant, who does not deal even with the numerous generally 
accessible sources about the mass destruction of the Jews, not to speak of 
trying to reach an independent opinion through a thorough considera-
tion, is not impaired either in his right to a hearing nor to an effective 
protection of law when the courts judge this mass destruction to be com-
45. See notes 88-97 infra and accompanying text. After the war, the Jewish population in the 
Federal Republic amounted to 30,000, down from the original 500,000 in the Reich. See Judg-
ment of May 8, 1952, BGHSt, 5 NJW 1183, 1184 (1952). 
46. Decision of Apr. 27, 1982, Bundesverfassungsgericht, Vorpriifungsausschuss, 35 NJW 
1803 (1982). 
47. Id. 
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monly known and consider irrelevant the mere offering of the names of 
individual witnesses.4s 
If other courts had harbored any doubt about the constitutional 
issue they would have been required by the prevailing law to refer the 
question to the Federal Constitutional Court. There is no record of 
any such referral. The Federal Supreme Court, the highest tribunal in 
civil and criminal matters, entertained no such doubt. In a case in-
volving a prosecution for criminal insult based on a leaflet branding 
the murder of millions of Jews as a "Zionist swindle," the Court gave 
short shrift to the defense argument: 
[N]o one who denies the historic fact of the murder of the Jews in the 
"Third Reich" can invoke the guarantee of freedom of opinion (Art. 5, 
para. 1 GG). Even in a confrontation on a question that concerns sub-
stantially the public as is the case here, no one has a protected interest to 
publicize untrue allegations. The documents about the destruction of 
millions of Jews are overwhelming.49 
The lower tribunals have taken essentially the same view of the alleged 
constitutional conflict, to the extent they have given it any attention at 
all.SO 
IV. THE LAW IN THE COURTS, 1960-1985 
Most of the courts and prosecutors have tried to do their best in 
coping with a law that contains some novel concepts unrelated to es-
tablished criminal law doctrine, formulated in vague language, moti-
vated by a traumatic collective experience, and saturated with political 
48. Id. (emphasis added). It should be kept in mind that the decision was taken not by the 
complete Senat (chamber) but by a committee of three judges who probed into the merits only to 
the extent necessary for them to find the complaint "manifestly groundless" and thus inadmissi-
ble, not worthy of consideration by the full Senat However, the brief language quoted above 
gives a good indication of what the outcome would have been in the full Senat. 
49. Judgment of Sept. 18, 1979, 75 Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 160, 161, 33 
NJW 45, 45 (1980). The Court pointed out that the defendant himself admitted the murder of 
millions but questioned the figure of six million as being too high. But the "objective content" of 
his statement did not sustain such limitation. Id. 
50. See, e.g., Judgment of July 23, 1980, Landgericht Bochum, No. 8 Ns 33 Js 287 /79, at 22. 
(Copies of unpublished opinions cited in this essay are on file at Michigan Law Review.] The 
court stated that in addition to the inapplicability of GG art. 5, the defendant could not rely on 
the protection of freedom of science clause in GG art. 5(3)(1). See also Judgment of Oct. 28, 
1980, OLG Cologne, 1981 NJW 1280, 1281 (admitting that general criminal law must be inter-
preted in the light of, and in observance of, basic rights: "Whoever downright denies the histori· 
cal fact of the destruction of the Jews may no longer claim the guarantee [of art. 5] - at any rate 
when the denial occurs in an injuring form.") (citations omitted). For the same reason this court 
approved the rejection of a reporter's claim of privilege under STGB art. 131(3). The court 
stressed that the defendant knew and intended all the factual elements of the crime. As another 
striking example, a 72-page appellate opinion of the Frankfurt Landgericht in five consolidated 
cases contains not a mention of the constitutional issue. Judgment of Mar. 25, 1981, Landgericht 
Frankfurt, No. 4 Ls 32176 (Ns) (appeal from five judgments of the Amtsgericht-Schoffengericht 
Frankfurt). 
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considerations of the day. In carrying the burden of protecting the 
democratic system of the young Republic, the judiciary has received 
relatively little assistance from the scholarly community, which would 
normally analyze and classify the legislative and case material with a 
view to helping develop an acceptable doctrine. The burden of provid-
ing a rational framework and guidance for the lower courts has rested 
heavily on the Federal Supreme Court. 
A. Case Categories: The Issues 
Depending upon the Code provisions applied, the cases penalizing 
the "Auschwitz lie" may be grouped in three basic categories: (1) at-
tacks on human dignity (article 130), alone or in conjunction with 
race-hatred incitement (article 131) or - if private petition is lodged 
-insult (article 185); (2) incitement to race hatred (article 131), alone 
or in conjunction with articles 130 or 185; (3) insult (article 185), 
alone or in conjunction with article 189 (disparaging the memory of 
the dead) or articles 130 or 131. 
The principal problem facing the courts has been to determine 
whether a given fact situation fell within the ambit of the serious crime 
of article 130. Where a private party lodged a petition, the court, in 
reality, could tum to the less weighty alternative of an insult under 
article 185. This has been a crucial determination because in some 
courts, at any rate, a conviction under article 130 may carry a sentence 
of one year's imprisonment, as against six months or merely a fine for 
an insult.51 Yet the line between the two fact situations is drawn, as 
we shall see, largely by the judges' intuitive reactions, with only a few 
somewhat more general criteria emerging. With some exceptions, the 
trial courts have been reluctant to follow the "attack on human dig-
nity" route, and their judgments of acquittal on this count have been 
subject to frequent reversal by the state courts of appeal and, even 
more consistently, by the Federal Supreme Court. 
The following are the issues with which the courts have had to 
grapple: 
(1) What is an attack on human dignity? 
(2) When is an act apt to breach public peace? The courts have not 
entered into the discussion of "objective" or "subjective" public peace 
that one encounters in other contexts. 
(3) What constitutes incitement to race hatred? 
(4) Are Jews "a race"? 
51. See Judgment of Mar. 25, 1981, Landgericht Frankfurt, No. 4 Ls 32176 (Ns); see also 
note 50 supra. 
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(5) Is the court required to admit evidence designed to disprove the 
existence of the extermination camps? 
Some specific issues have arisen in prosecutions for "insult" under 
article 185: 
(1) Are Jews as a group protected against "insult"? 
(2) Which acts involving "the Auschwitz lie" are capable of caus-
ing injury? 
(3) Who is a legitimate petitioner? 
B. On Judicial Notice 
In German as in common law, courts may take notice of generally 
known facts without the need of formal proof. 52 German courts do 
not seem to agree whether judicial notice may or must be taken of the 
extermination of Jews or whether appropriate evidence must be placed 
on the record to prove the falsity of "the lie." 
Although the Federal Supreme Court held in 1976 that the essen-
tial facts of the Jewish persecution were "generally" and even "pub-
licly known,'' it suggested that such facts must be introduced in the 
trial and that "this can be done expediently by hearing a historian as 
an expert witness."53 
In a later case the High Court spoke of the "historical fact of the 
murder of the Jews in the 'Third Reich,' " without, however, any ref-
erence to the problem of proof. 54 It was on this statement that the 
appeals court in Bochum relied when it refused to entertain any evi-
dence designed to prove the "Auschwitz lie." The court assumed as 
true the defense allegation that a French professor, Robert Faurisson, 
"after a thorough working through the 'gas chambers' complex," and 
an American Professor Butz, "after five years' research of all sources 
available to him,'' had reached the conclusion that the mass murders 
of Jews had not taken place; but this fact, the court held, represented 
only the research results of the two witnesses and did not upset "his-
torically secure and thus generally accepted knowledge."55 On similar 
52. See STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG (Code of Criminal Procedure) art. 244(3)(2). 
53. Judgment of Nov. 11, 1976, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], No. 2 StR 508/76 (unpublished), 
quoted in Cobler, supra note 15, at 168. On the view of the screening committee of the Federal 
Constitutional Court, see text at note 48 supra. 
54. Judgment of Sept. 18, 1979, 75 BGHZ 160, 161, 33 NJW 45, 45 (1980). For more on this 
case, see notes 88-97 infra and accompanying text. 
55. Judgment of July 23, 1980, Landgericht Bochum, No. 8 Ns 33 Js 287/79, at 17, 19 
(appeal from judgment ofJan. 17, 1980, Schiiffengericht Witten); see also note 50supra & note 74 
infra. Robert Faurisson, Maitre de Conferences (Lecturer) at the University of Lyon, has pub· 
lished and broadcast a number of statements asserting "the Auschwitz lie." He has been the 
subject of civil and criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Judgment of June 28, 1983, Cass. Crim., Fr., 
1983 Bulletin des arrets de la Cour de cassation, chambre criminelle 518, which affirmed the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal of Paris upholding Faurisson's conviction for group defamation 
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grounds of irrelevancy the court upheld the refusal to hear witnesses 
claiming personal knowledge of the nonexistence of the camps, to ob-
tain expert opinions on when the camps were built (it was alleged that 
they were constructed after the war), and to hear a photographic ex-
pert who would prove that the purported photographs of the camps 
were recent falsifications.56 
In another case, the court in Frankfurt emphatically proclaimed 
the existence of the extermination measures to be an "established" and 
"historically proven" "historical fact" which "does not need any 
proof" and that no evidence need be admitted on this issue. Neverthe-
less, "manifest historical facts were merely introduced into the pro-
ceedings by means of Professor Broszat's opinion."57 In what appears 
to be an isolated instance, reflecting perhaps the observation by the 
Federal Supreme Court in the earlier case, the court evidently pre-
ferred to accept an authoritative confirmation of the facts which it felt 
mandated to take as proven. 
C. The Case Law 
In this area of the law, consideration of the facts of the cases, in 
more or less detail, is vital for a meaningful analysis of the judicial 
posture. 58 The stories behind the cases reveal a good deal about cer-
tain dark corners of life in contemporary Germany. 
1. The Federal Supreme Court on Articles 130 and 131 
In 1981, the Federal Supreme Court had before it an appeal from 
the court of Braunschweig. 59 In that case the defendant was charged 
with distributing a brochure denying that "Hitler's gas chambers" had 
existed and that the "genocide" of the Jews had taken place, and 
claiming that such "six-million lies" and "horror tales" of essentially 
Zionist origin had brought about a gigantic political and financial 
swindle, principally for the benefit of the State of Israel. Also included 
was a picture of a gallows with a person beneath it, and a text to the 
and his sentence of three months' imprisonment (suspended), a fine of 5000 francs, and damages 
to the complainant. The court of appeal had reversed the conviction by the trial court for incite-
ment to race hatred, and the Cour de cassation agreed. As of the fall 1985, A.R. Butz was 
Associate Professor of Engineering at Northwestern University. See A.R. BUTZ, THE HOAX OF 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1976). 
56. Judgment of July 23, 1980, Landgericht Bochum, No. 8 Ns 33 Js 287/79, at 17-19. 
57. Judgment of Mar. 25, 1981, Landgericht Frankfurt, No. 4 Ls 32/76 (Ns), at 43-44. 
58. Unhappily, in this as in other areas not all cases of even the highest courts are published, 
and in most instances the published texts provide a bare minimum of facts. 
59. Judgment of Jan. 14, 1981, BGHSt, 1981 NEUE ZEITSCHR!Fr FUR STRAFRECHT [NSTZ] 
258. 
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effect that on this gallows people were tortured and blackmailed by 
their Jewish accusers to give false evidence and were murdered "in an 
assembly line" manner. The defendant was convicted and fined for 
disseminating writings that incited to race hatred (article 131). He 
was, however, acquitted of the more serious charge of attacking 
human dignity by incitement to hatred under article 130. The trial 
court concluded that although the brochure could be seen as an attack 
on the honor of the Jews as a population group, it was not an attack 
against human dignity; it was not apt to disturb public peace because it 
could not be assumed that the circle of persons to whom the brochure 
was sent could feel threatened in their sense of security. 
The Federal Supreme Court reversed; it affirmed the conviction 
under article 131 but disagreed with the trial court's refusal to apply 
article 130. In the context of article 131, the Supreme Court came to 
grips with the issue of whether Jews could be considered a "race" for 
the purpose of this provision. It dismissed as irrelevant the defense 
argument that there could not be a crime of incitement to race hatred 
since the Jews did not form a race in a biological-anthropological 
sense. "The concept of race hatred," the Court declared, 
falls within the conceptual world of racial ideology. This is not based on 
a scientifically grounded, clearly delimited race concept. Rather it pro-
ceeds from merely an approximate anthropological classification of hu-
manity into human races, that is, according to common hereditary, 
predominantly physical characteristics, as a starting point for a theory 
pursuant to which biological diversity of the "races" is supposed to be 
the cause of their relative superiority or inferiority and corresponding 
different value. The emotionally heightened hostility of the provocation 
directed against the Jews is one of the phenomena of the incitement to 
race hatred which the lawmaker wanted to include in article 131.60 
In reversing the acquittal under article 130 the Supreme Court 
confirmed that an attack against human dignity exists only if "it is 
directed against the unrenounceable (unverzichtbar) and nonincidental 
(unausbleibbar) core of a personality of another, against him as a 
human being, and only if it denies his value." This language clearly 
recalls the rationale offered by the government spokesman for the new 
article 130 and mentioned earlier as part of its legislative history. 61 
Contrary to the court below, however, the Supreme Court found 
that there was such an attack in this case, because the brochure "was 
apt to provoke an emotional, hostile stance toward the Jews." The 
distributor appeared to identify himself with the fundamental National 
Socialist outlook 
60. Id. 
61. See text at note 30 supra. 
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which classifies the Jewish fellow citizen as a member of an inferior 
"race," that branded him formally by forcing him to wear the Jewish 
star, deprived him of all rights, and treated him no longer as a fellow 
human being. In such cases involving similar allegations, the Supreme 
Court has approved the findings that writings which aim at stirring up 
hostile feelings against the Jews in general and against the Jews living in 
Germany in particular constituted attacks against human dignity.62 
The High Court thus rejected the notion of the court below that it is 
the sense of security of the brochure's addressees (rather than their 
potential response to the incitement) that should be the yardstick in 
finding a breach of the public peace. The same Court had made it 
clear in an earlier case that article 130 does not require proof of an 
actual breach of public peace: 
It suffices that there are justified grounds for the apprehension that the 
attack will shatter confidence in legal security, even if it is only on the 
part of the population group against which the attack is directed. That 
this is true of an antisemitic smear tract destined for distribution needs 
no further explanation in light of the historical experience. 63 
In an observation bearing upon general methods of interpretation, 
the Court found that the trial tribunal should not have limited its eval-
uation to the contents of the printed text "along with the generally 
known facts," but was obligated to include "also other circumstances 
that are significant for the facts of the case"; the reasoning of the con-
tested judgment did not make clear that the defendant's "eventual 
identification with the National Socialist ideology" was taken into 
account.64 
2. Lower Courts on Articles 130 and 131 
a. Teachers in trouble. In the nature of things, only a small frac-
tion of litigated cases reaches the high federal tribunal. But a broad 
range of activities has been prosecuted - all the way from a teacher's 
casual remark in a classroom to a "one-man propaganda machine" 
spouting open letters, thousands of postcards, periodic publications, 
placards, etc. The "Auschwitz lie" has appeared also in a variety of 
versions, ranging from a simple "I am a donkey - I still believe the 
62. 1981NSTZ258 (citing judgment of Nov. 10, 1976, BGH, No. 2 StR 508/?6; decision of 
Apr. 25, 1979, No. 3 StR 74/79 [S); decision of Apr. 9, 1980, No. 3 StR 506/79 [S) (reversing, 
among others, acquittals for attacks on human dignity (incitement to hatred) in the judgment of 
May 23, 1978, Landgericht Nuremberg-Furth, No. 1KLs91Js27 412176, and judgment of May 
18, 1979, Landgericht Nuremberg-Furth, No. 1 KLs 91 Js 4500178)). 
63. Judgment of Apr. 21, 1961, 16 BGHSt 49, 56-57 (an antisemitic tract about a bankers' 
conspiracy in the United States held hostile to the Constitution and as inciting hatred (STGB 
arts. 93, 130)). 
64. Judgment of Jan. 14, 1981, BGHSt, 1981 NSTZ 258. The Supreme Court was clearly 
concerned lest history be omitted from the relevant context. 
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lies about the extermination camps," to greatly embroidered pro-
nouncements of elaborate offensiveness. 
A court in Goslar made the following findings of fact. A middle-
aged teacher (a family man with several children) in a vocational 
school discussed in his class an impending class excursion that was to 
include a visit to the Dachau concentration camp. In this context, the 
teacher observed that there were no concentration camps or killings of 
Jews in the Third Reich: there were only work camps in which Jews 
lived peacefully with their families. When several students mentioned 
films about the extermination of Jews the defendant observed that they 
were American-made; he had at his home documentary evidence 
which anyone was welcome to inspect. At the end of the class he 
asked that his statements not be passed on because they were prohib-
ited "and he has a family to support." When the story began to make 
the rounds in the school, the editor of the student paper obtained a 
written statement from four students confirming that the controversial 
assertion had been made. Thereupon the defendant assembled the en-
tire class with the exception of "the four"; in response to his plea for 
help, all students present signed a paper denying that he had made the 
allegations attributed to him and that he had ever questioned the exis-
tence and inhumanity of the camps. With this paper in hand the de-
fendant then visited the parents of the four "dissidents" and 
threatened them with court action and other "difficulties" (hinting at 
possible trouble with the immigration authorities in the case of one 
family of Portuguese nationality). A few days later, when the 
teacher's approach to the parents became known, the entire class 
signed another statement revoking, in effect, the earlier paper and con-
firming the allegations against the defendant. 
A Hamburg Jew, whose wife, mother, and brother had died in the 
concentration camps, and the Hamburg Jewish community filed ape-
tition of criminal insult. In the proceedings the defendant denied mak-
ing the contested statements and claimed that his efforts to stimulate a 
balanced class discussion were intentionally distorted by the students 
in revenge for poor grades he had given in a physics test. 
After hearing some twenty witnesses the court found the defendant 
(who was without prior criminal record), guilty of an attack against 
human dignity (article 130), in conjunction with insult (article 185) 
and disparagement of the memory of the dead (article 189); it imposed 
a suspended sentence of six months' imprisonment. 65 In an elaborate, 
carefully reasoned opinion (which incidentally provides some insight 
65. Judgment of Mar. 27, 1981, Amtsgericht Goslar, No. 6 Ls (0) 303 Js 3643/80. The 
original sentence of seven months was reduced by eliminating a conviction for duress against the 
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into the teacher-student relationship in a newly multi-ethnic commu-
nity), the court followed the interpretation of the attack-on-human-
dignity concept and the breach-of-public-peace prerequisite as given 
by the Federal Supreme Court. 66 
Another teacher's trouble was the subject of a case before a court 
in Schleswig. 67 A letter to the editor, published in a periodical for 
which the defendant was responsible, noted a news story that a history 
teacher was fired because he branded the "destruction of six million 
Jews" a lie: "Thus, once more," the letter stated, "one who opposes 
Jewish propaganda is silenced while Jews(!) are trained as teachers for 
German children." In an editorial annotation to the letter the defen-
dant signaled that he approved of its contents. 
The trial court found that although the contents of the letter fell 
within the scope of article 130 the charge must be dismissed on the 
grounds that the editor could not be held criminally responsible for 
the contents of a letter addressed to him and published as such. The 
appeals court reversed. The letter to the editor, the court reasoned, 
incited hatred against the Jews in that it denied their ability to teach 
German children and pretended that the destruction of the Jews was a 
lie based on Jewish propaganda. The aim was to make Jews, as a part 
of the population, contemptible and inferior by attacking the human 
dignity of each individual Jew, "in its indispensable personality 
core."68 The letter was apt to disturb public peace by potentially shak-
ing the sense .of security of the attacked group or by provoking the 
"incited" group to insults. 69 The defendant was liable for publishing 
such a letter.70 
Another case, drawn also from a school setting, is one of a number 
that came out of the aftermath of the showing of the television film 
Holocaust. It concerns a youngster who at the age of six had been 
parents. Decision of Sept. 21, 1981, Landgericht Braunschweig, No. 31Ns303 Js 3643/80. The 
judgment has become final. 
66. See text at notes 55-58 supra. There are potential breaches of public peace when the 
entire population loses confidence in legal security, or the attacked group alone feels threatened, 
or when there is a strengthening of the tendency to violate the law on the part of the group which 
has inclinations toward violations of the law. The defendant's statements, the court held, were 
objectively apt to disturb public order by fueling the newly increased neo-Nazi tendencies and 
impairing the sense of security of the Jews in the Republic; the statements were made in "a large 
circle" of young persons by a teacher whose duty it was to educate them for democracy, with a 
potential for a "multiplying" effect; the defendant "knew that his statements do not correspond 
to the truth." Amtsgericht Goslar, No. 6 Ls (0) 303 Js 3643/80, at 13, 18. 
67. Judgment of Dec. 14, 1977, OLG Schleswig, 32 MONATSSCHRIFT FOR DEUTSCHES 
RECHT [MDR] 333 (1978). 
68. Id. (citing judgment of Nov. 15, 1967, 21 BGHSt 371, 22 MDR 255 (1968)). 
69. OLG Schleswig, 32 MDR 333. 
70. Id. 
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enrolled by his parents (born in 1918 and 1920) in the Viking Youth, a 
right-wing organization, and was brought up in a right-wing atmo-
sphere. A high school graduate, age nineteen, he and his teenage girl-
friend appeared as responsible editors for a student periodical that was 
distributed in an edition of ten thousand copies in local and other 
schools. In a story directed particularly at young people and com-
menting on Holocaust ("a horror show of the worst Hollywood 
make"), the National Socialist terror and murders were characterized 
as falsifications: "renowned historians" including the "famous Ameri-
can Professor Butz with his book on The Hoax of the [Twentieth] Cen-
tury" had provided the "breakthrough." Other books and 
documentations were cited to disprove the "monstrous lying provoca-
tions." The "gas chambers" were mock-ups built under the direction 
of the American military, and camp inmates died of illness and under-
nourishment owing to war conditions. 
The juvenile court in Cologne held both defendants guilty of vio-
lating articles 130 and 131. 71 The young man was sentenced to a fine 
(ninety "daily rates" of fifteen marks), while his friend, who had with-
drawn from the co-editorship, got away with a warning and forty days 
of service for the public good. The court noted that, in addition to the 
usual allegation of the "Auschwitz lie," Jews, particularly American 
Jews, were pictured as inventors of the "legend." Although such alle-
gations were quoted as the opinions of others, they were approved 
without reservation. 
The state appeals court affirmed. 72 In embracing the trial tribu-
nal's analysis, the court stressed that even the "revelations" in the 
form of extensive citations from historical literature may tend to stir 
hostility against the Jews, and in this case young readers were ex-
horted "to protect themselves" against "the lies." The potential for 
disturbance of public peace existed from the sole fact that the story 
had appeared in a high school student paper and was addressed -
combined with a direct challenge - to young people still in a state of 
intellectual development. Here also the court rejected the argument, 
paradoxically advanced by the defense, that since Jews were not a race 
in a biological-anthropological sense there could be no race-hatred 
incitement. 73 
71. Judgment of Feb. 21, 1980, Amtsgericht Cologne, No. 652 (253) Ls 340/79 jug. - 121 Js 
145/79. 
72. Judgment of Oct. 28, 1980, OLG Cologne, 34 NJW 1280 (1981). This judgment is finnt. 
73. Id. at 1281. For the discussion of the constitutional issue in this opinion, see note 50 
supra. In May 1986, a Koblenz court found a 49-year-old high school teacher guilty of insult 
and incitement to hatred for making statements to students, e.g., that Auschwitz was "an Ameri-
can invention." The court sentenced him to one year's imprisonment, suspended on good behav-
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b. Pamphleteers: the trend. The "run of the mill" cases deal typ-
ically with production and dissemination of "Auschwitz lie" variants 
by means of brochures, placards, periodicals, open letters to public 
officials and mass media, or books. More often than not the defen-
dant, young or old, is a hardened extremist with a prior record of neo-
Nazi activity. 74 
It is difficult to discern a consistent pattern in the judgments of the 
various courts, and the sentences differ from one court to another. 
The indeterminate language of article 130 allows for substantial judi-
cial discretion. The varied degrees of offensiveness in the language 
employed necessarily involve a subjective evaluation and make com-
ior, and barred him from teaching for a period of three years. If the sentence becomes final the 
defendant may Jose his status as a government official. The fact that state and local school 
supervisory authorities failed to intervene over a period of years in the face of mounting com-
plaints was considered a mitigating circumstance. The court observed that "powerful protectors 
must have been at work," as the defendant is said to have threatened his supervisor with "his 
wide-ranging political connections." Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 17, 1986, at 4, col. 6; 
see also judgment of July 23, 1984, Niedersiichsischer Disziplinarhof (Disciplinary Tribunal of 
Lower Saxony), 39 NJW 1278 (1986) (affirming a salary reduction and ordering a demotion of a 
high school teacher (Oberstudiendirektor)). 
74. As an example, the Landgericht Bochum upheld the conviction under article 130 of a tax 
accountant, born in 1920, for producing a brochure, entitled Maidanek Forever?, which adver-
tised a book by J.G. Burg, a "Jew, [an] anti-Zionist writer'' who "makes short shrift of the mass 
destruction lie" and "the Zionist million-size swindle." Extensive quotations from the book are 
given. Judgment of July 23, 1980, Landgericht Bochum, No. 8 Ns 33 Js 287/79. The sentence 
was for six months' imprisonment, suspended on good behavior. According to the brochure, 
Maidanek was "a model camp." "There were no doubt inconspicuous slips on the part of the 
personnel, but murders, and of this magnitude ... ! Never!" Id. at 7-8. The defendant claimed 
that as a former SS man who was criminally prosecuted as such after the war, he was interested 
in clearing up the history; the Zionists wanted to bring about a new antisemitism in Germany by 
spreading the "Auschwitz lie" since that was necessary for the survival of the State of Israel; the 
Burg book was designed to bring about a reconciliation between the Jews and the Germans. The 
court noted that the quotations from the book are replete with offensive epithets and the Zionists 
are blamed for spreading "the lie" in order to get reparations. On the court's refusal to call 
professors and other witnesses or experts, see text at notes 55-56 supra. The court ordered the 
seizure of copies of the brochure. Some fifteen proceedings were previously instituted against the 
defendant, most of which were terminated because of the short statute of limitations. 
See, similarly, judgment of Mar. 25, 1981, Landgericht Frankfurt, No. 4 Ls 32176 (Ns). 
Defendant, born in 1914, son of a teacher, Jost his father at the age of three, was brought up by a 
"national-conservative" grandfather, was unable to study beyond Gymnasium for financial rea-
sons. He joined the National Socialist Party in 1933, served as a soldier in Russia, became an 
interpreter and journalist; since 1976 he had been Jiving on support from relatives and political 
sympathizers and had devoted himself to two organizations (Aktionsgemeinschaft Nationales Eu-
ropa and Kampjbund Deutscher Soldaten) which he had founded. Id. at 7-8. The "Auschwitz 
lie" was the principal theme in leaflets written in German and English, letters to broadcasting 
executives, to a general, etc. With his collaborators he started the "I am a donkey" campaign. 
With proceedings pending against him in two other courts, he was convicted in Frankfurt of 
eight separate cases of insult, two attacks on human dignity of Jews (including a charge of falsifi-
cation of the Anne Frank diary), one disparagement of the memory of the dead, two cases of 
aggravated calumny, and one case of attempted duress. He received a "comprehensive sentence" 
of two years and eight months imprisonment. Id. at 3. The medical expert found him intelligent, 
spiritually alert, and responsible ("neither a paranoiac nor a sick fanatic") and related his "one-
dimensional" insistence on the "Auschwitz lie" to his "emotionally grounded basic beliefs such 
as love of the fatherland, honor, loyalty, good character." Id. at 46. 
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parisons difficult. A court passing upon the text of two leaflets distrib-
uted by the same defendant would explain a lower sentence in one case 
on the ground that the text was "less embellished" and thus of "lower 
intensity" than in the other.75 Courts, particularly those at the trial 
level, incline to the view that a "simple" denial of mass extermination, 
which is not accompanied by a "specific or at least incidental charge" 
against the "Zionists" for originating the "gassing lie," would not con-
stitute an attack on human dignity.76 Even where such a charge was 
made against "Zionists and other professional liars" a lower court ac-
quitted a defendant, publisher of a periodical, of a charge of incitement 
to race hatred, since the Jews were not attacked for belonging to a 
certain race but rather were merely accused of ignominious behavior 
("peddling a lie"). The appeals court rejected this reasoning and re-
versed the acquittal. 11 
Another trial court acquitted a defendant of an article 130 charge 
where the "Auschwitz lie" was a minor component in a book which 
called for an elaborate scheme of an "Aryan Europe" based on the 
"Fuhrer principle." This court viewed the contents as not exceeding 
the bounds of legitimate criticism of a democratic state, but the judg-
ment of acquittal was reversed, in this instance by the Federal 
Supreme Court itself. 78 Finally, as mentioned earlier, the highly con-
troversial refusal by the Hamburg courts to prosecute was justified on 
75. Judgment of Mar. 25, 1981, Landgericht Frankfurt, No. 4 Ls 32176 (Ns). 
76. Decision of Feb. 17, 1982, OLG Celle, 35 NJW 1545 (1982) (citing cases from courts in 
Frankfurt, Segeberg, Nuremberg-Fiirth, Goslar, as well as prosecutors in Nuremberg). 
77. Judgment of Feb. 3, 1981, OLG Hamm, 1981 NSTZ 262. In the appeals court's view, the 
court below failed to distinguish between the true reason for the hatred and the means employed. 
Although under article 131 the feelings of hatred must be directed against others for the sole 
reason that they belong to a certain race, the characteristics attributed to them need not be 
present only in that race. Id. The court stressed that article 131 was designed to serve the 
struggle against the revival of racism and antisemitism in Germany, in view of the historical 
experience of the danger of "racially" motivated persecutions. This court and others have refused 
to draw the distinction urged by the defense between "the Jews" and the "Zionists." 
78. Judgment of Aug. 24, 1977, BGH, No. 3 StR 229177 (S). In this case the publisher of the 
German translation of a book entitled Is Race Consciousness Reprehensible?, originally published 
by a "Canadian scientific institute," was prosecuted for illegal activities against the state, defama-
tion of the state, and violation of article 130. The book rejected democracy in favor of the "Fiih-
rer principle," eulogized the Aryan race, minimized the Nazi crimes and euthanasia, and called 
for an Aryan Europe, a Federation of Aryan Nations, the removal of the nonwhites, reducing 
Jews to guest-people, and a prohibition, under the penalty of sterilization, of mixed marriages. 
The trial court (Landgericht Flensburg), pointing to passages where race separation is advocated 
as self-survival, and race-hatred and racist zealots are repudiated, acquitted on the ground that 
the contents did not exceed the bounds of legitimate criticism of the democratic state; although 
presenting "a presumptuous and overbearing valuation of the Aryan, [it does] not contain an 
attack on human diguity of the undervalued persons in the sense of [article 130]." Id. at 3. The 
Supreme Court vigorously disagreed with the legal interpretation, reversed, and remanded. Note 
also the reversal of acquittals on two counts for race-hatred incitement and two counts of insult 
by the FrankfurtLandgericht. Judgment of Mar. 25, 1981, Landgericht Frankfurt, No. 4 Ls 32/ 
76 (Ns), at 2-3. 
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the ground that the defendant's target was not "Jews in general" but 
only "the clique of international Jewry."79 
The apparent inclination of the lower courts to avoid convictions 
under articles 130 and 131 is perhaps even stronger in cases where a 
private party lodges a petition. In that situation the courts, if they do 
not acquit, may opt for a conviction under article 185 for an insult, at 
times limiting the penalty to a fine. 80 On the other hand, to add to the 
diversity, some sentences for an insult under that article match in se-
verity, or even exceed, those imposed for the more serious offense 
against human dignity. 
In general, the Federal Supreme Court and- with some interest-
ing exceptions81 - the state appeals courts have often tended to re-
verse judgments of acquittal because they have taken a more serious 
view of the "Auschwitz lie" than the trial courts. One can only specu-
late about the reasons behind this pattern of judicial interaction. For 
one thing, trial judges are generally of a younger generation, without 
oppressive memories and - understandably - without a sense of per-
sonal guilt. Lacking extensive experience, they may feel less confident 
in handing down convictions for a distinctly political crime. Perhaps 
they also are more in tune with local attitudes than the higher-level 
judiciary, and are less responsive to the national policy that has re-
flected both the recent historical experience and a sensitivity to inter-
national considerations. 82 
3. The ''Insult" Alternative 
The trials and tribulations in the application of the insult article 
185, prior to its modification by the 1985 law, are illustrated in two 
cases. 
a. The case of the ''Sons and Daughters of Deportees from 
France." This case arose out of a 1980 demonstration in Cologne of 
mostly French Jews, the "Sons and Daughters of Deportees from 
France," at the occasion of a Nazi war criminal trial held in that city. 
The defendant distributed to the participants, journalists, and bystand-
ers several copies of a leaflet which he himself had produced. Under 
the heading "Incitement to Hatred" the leaflet declared that, contrary 
79. Decision of Nov. 26, 1958, Landgericht Hamburg, 14 JZ 176 (1959). Here the appeals 
court affirmed the refusal. 
80. See, e.g., Judgment of Mar. 25, 1981, Landgericht Frankfurt, No. 4 Ls 32176 (Ns), at 17, 
19, 68. 
81. Decision of Feb. 17, 1982, OLG Celle, 35 NJW 1545 (1982); judgment of May 2, 1978, 
OLG Koblenz, 12 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 193 (1979). 
82. Due to the limited availability of trial court opinions, the above considerations are neces-
sarily based on not more than a sample of cases. 
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to the opinions of federal judges and prosecutors and contrary to the 
presentation in the film Holocaust, there had been no mass destruction 
of Jews through gassing, as witnessed by the statements of varied his-
torians, first and foremost by the "Jewish historian" J.G. Burg. The 
reverse side of the leaflet contained a report on the earlier "I am a 
donkey" demonstration in Hamburg, 83 without, however, any mention 
of the banners carried in that demonstration in which Israel was 
blamed for the "gassing lies." Burg, the report continued, supported 
the Hamburg demonstration, but a criminal proceeding was instituted 
against the participants upon complaint by the Hamburg Jewish 
community. 
The trial court interpreted the defendant's leaflet as purporting to 
brand those who believed in the mass destruction stories as liars, 
prevaricators, and falsifiers of history and to attribute to the Jews at 
least a part of the responsibility for the "gassing lie." It found the 
defendant guilty of an attack on human dignity - incitement to ha-
tred - according to article 130 and sentenced him to imprisonment 
for a year and three months. The Landgericht reduced the penalty to 
ten months, but the state appeals court in Celle reversed the 
conviction. 84 
In the appeals court's perception, the leaflet attributed the belief in 
the holocaust only to the German federal authorities ("the Jewish his-
torian Burg" holding the opposite view) but not to the Jewish popula-
tion in the Federal Republic (the participants in the Cologne 
demonstration being predominantly French Jews not covered by arti-
cle 130): "it cannot, without more, be concluded that the leaflet flatly 
accused the local Jewish population of originating the 'gassing lie.'" 
There could be no finding of an attack on humanity where the denial 
of the mass destruction was not accompanied by "qualifying charac-
teristics," that is, by particularly offensive and inhuman invectives 
such as a charge that the Jews themselves were the perpetrators of the 
"gassing lie.''85 Because of the absence of such characteristics, which 
delimit article 130 from article 185, the appeals court quashed the sen-
tence and remanded the case to the Landgericht with the directive to 
determine whether the facts warranted a conviction for an insult pur-
suant to the latter article, provided the requisite petition was filed by 
an authorized person. 
In the proceeding on remand the defendant was in fact convicted 
83. See text at note 46 supra. 
84. Decision of Feb. 17, 1982, OLG Celle, 35 NJW 1545 (1982). 
85. The court cites unpublished judgments of other tribunals and distinguishes the case from 
judgment of Sept. 18, 1979, 75 BGHZ 160, 33 NJW 45 (1980). 35 NJW at 1546. 
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of an insult and sentenced to a fine (eighty-five "daily rates" of fifteen 
marks). However, on a new appeal by the defendant the appeals court 
rendered a judgment of acquittal of the insult conviction on the 
ground that "upon further inquiry by the Senate [chamber]" it tran-
spired that the petitioner was not a Jew.86 Only "full Jews" 
(Volljuden) or "Jewish mixed breeds" (iiidische Mischlinge) "who 
were persecuted in the Third Reich or who would have been perse-
cuted had they been living at that time" were entitled to file the peti-
tion; although the petitioner sympathized with the Jewish participants 
in the demonstration he was not offended by the statements in the 
leaflet because they were not directed against him as a "non-Jew." 
Some of the inferences drawn by the court are curious. Thus, ac-
cording to the court's interpretation of the leaflet, the belief in the 
existence of the holocaust could not be imputed to the Jews ("the Jew-
ish historian Burg" did not believe in it). And, even accepting the 
court's assumption that the French Jews deported to Germany by the 
National Socialists and returning there were not protected by article 
185, there was no evidence to support the court's belief that the leaflet 
with a text commonly distributed elsewhere in Germany was directed 
exclusively at them (even though the demonstration was "predomi-
nantly" by the French deportees).87 
Nevertheless, the court's refusal to consider the distribution of this 
particular leaflet a serious crime against the public order is not, as we 
have seen, out of line with lower jurisdictions elsewhere, as the text 
omitted the usual charge against Jews of having originated "the lie" 
and contained no other aggravating statements. In dismissing the case 
for the absence of a legitimate complainant, the Celle court relied on a 
judgment of the Federal Supreme Court in the second of the two prin-
cipal cases in this field, which is discussed in the next section. 
b. The Federal Supreme Court and the Nuremberg racial laws. In 
this case88 the defendant posted a leaflet on a public wall declaring 
that the claim of the murder of millions of Jews in the Third Reich 
86. Decision of Jan. 30, 1985, OLG Celle, No. 1 Ss 126/84 - 10 Js 228/80 StA. 
87. 35 NJW 1545 (1982). 
88. For the final judgment, see 75 BGHZ 160, 33 NJW 45 (1980); see also text at note 49 
supra. This case is relied upon in the judgment of Feb. 24, 1981, Landgericht Frankfurt (juvenile 
criminal chamber), No. 50 Js 29.138179 Ns (confirming, with a modification, the sentence be-
low). A juvenile with a record of persistent right-extremist activities, including a previous con-
viction, currently deputy chairman of the statewide "People's Socialist Movement of Germany" 
which wants the National Socialist Party restored, printed and distributed more than 1000 leaf-
lets in which the "historical fact" (the court's words) of the mass extermination in gas chambers 
is denied; German and foreign professors are cited, and the allegation is made that thus far no 
witness has appeared to confirm a "gassing." The "provocative question" (the court's words) is 
posed: "What shall we do? We have no taste for lying." The Jewish Community of Frankfurt 
filed a petition. The court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence from eight months to 
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was a Zionist swindle that "could not be accepted." According to the 
line of decisions described above there may have been a basis for pros-
ecution under article 130, as the text went beyond the "simple" denial 
of the "gassing lie." However, the proceeding was instituted upon pri-
vate petition under article 185 rather than under article 130. The 
Landgericht in Mainz prohibited the posting of the offensive state-
ments, 89 but the appeals court in Koblenz reversed and dismissed the 
complaint. 90 
The Federal Supreme Court reinstated the prohibition in a broad-
ranging opinion that dealt with four issues: (1) Was the prohibition 
compatible with the Basic Law? (2) Were the statements capable of 
causing personal injury? (3) Did "the Jews" constitute a group that 
was delimited with sufficient clarity to allow prosecution for an insult? 
(4) Was the complainant personally injured and therefore entitled to 
file a complaint? 
seven months and two weeks (suspended on good behavior) because the court below had mistak-
enly taken into account a previous conviction. 
89. Judgment of Apr. 6, 1977, Landgericht Mainz, 11 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 189 (1978). The 
defendant, a gardener, used the wall regularly for posting "radical-right" publications. Id. at 
190. 
90. Judgment of May 2, 1978, OLG Koblenz, 12 KRITISCHE Jurnz 193 (1979). This was a 
proceeding before the Zivilsenat grounded in BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (Civil Code) art. 
823, as well as in STGB art. 185. Here are the court's principal arguments: 
(1) The Federal Supreme Court had held in a 1958 decision that the 30,000 Jews presently 
living in Germany and formerly persecuted by the Nazis formed a sufficiently defined group for 
the purposes of article 185. Decision of Feb. 28, 1958, 11 BGHSt 207; see also judgment of Apr. 
21, 1961, 16 BGHSt 49, 57. Although the Supreme Court did not say so expressly, relatives of 
the persecuted persons were not included. The plaintiff, a student and the grandson of a Jewish 
grandfather who perished in Auschwitz, himself "not a Jew" and only a relative, did not belong 
to such a group. Moreover, the "arguments of the Supreme Court are contradictory and thus do 
not persuade." 12 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ at 195. 
(2) The defendant did not aim the insult expressly at the Jews and their relations but rather 
at all those, Jews and non-Jews, who denied the "Auschwitz lie" - and of these there were so 
many that they clearly could not be viewed as "a group." 
(3) The very denial of the mass extermination by the defendant excluded any implication of 
his approval thereof. 
( 4) The question of the origin of "the lie" was left open in the leaflet - the beneficiaries of 
"the lie" were presumed to be "political or ideological groups," not necessarily Jews. The de-
fendant rejected the charge of antisemitism and cheap-talk Goebbels propaganda; his purpose 
was to express his discontent with the official historiography and the postwar prevailing political 
conditions. The words "Zionist swindle" could not necessarily be attributed to all Jews ("not all 
Jews or Israelis are Zionists"). 
For a critical comment see Thomas Blanke in the left-leaning Kritische Justiz. Blanke, 
Anmerkung, 12 KRITISCHE Jus-r1z 197 (1979). Blanke believes the above decision would be 
acceptable if it were based on a consistent liberal premise which, as a matter of principle, would 
exclude political controversy from the reach of the criminal judge. This, however, he feels has 
not been the case (citing Nettelbeck, Meinungsiiusserung und Tatsachenbehauptung: Ein Bericht 
fiber Einiiugigkeiten in der Zivilgerichtsbarkeit, 11 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 135 (1978)), because the 
protection of honor in both civil and criminal law has been manipulated in favor of the political 
right. Blanke, supra, at 198. He points out that if the Koblenz view were to be upheld, in the 
foreseeable future, when the last of the persecutees will have died, the Jews would again be 
exposed to "racist incitement and pogrom campaigns." Id. at 199. 
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The court's view on the.first issue has been described earlier, in the 
context of the judicial posture toward constitutional questions.91 
Dealing jointly with the second and third issues, the High Court 
attempted to draw a line between a mere falsification of history and an 
injurious invective. No one can claim personal injury, the court rea-
soned, from a mere presentation of a false version of history, even if it 
is expressed in strong words causing shock and indignation. There are 
other means for seeking historically secured truth than a recourse to 
the courts. The statement in the leaflet, however, was not directed 
toward a specific understanding of history. Denying the fact of the 
racial murder of the Jews amounted to disavowing their "inhuman" 
and "unique" fate which 
gives every one of them a claim to recognition and respect, above all on 
the part of the citizens of the land burdened by this past. . . . The very 
historical fact that humans were segregated according to their origin 
under the so-called Nuremberg laws and were robbed of their individual-
ity with a view to their extermination, gives the Jews living in the Fed-
eral Republic a special personal relationship with their fellow citizens; in 
this relationship the past is present even today. They are entitled, as a 
component of their personal self-image, to be viewed as a part of a group, 
singled out by fate, to which all others owe a particular moral responsi-
bility, and that is an aspect of their honor. The respect of this self-image 
constitutes for every one of them one of the guarantees against a repeti-
tion of discrimination and a basis for their life in the Federal Republic. 
Whoever attempts to deny these events deprives each and every one of 
them of the personal worth to which they are entitled. For the affected 
person such denial means a continuation of the discrimination against 
the group of people to which he belongs, and simultaneously a direct 
discrimination against his own person. 92 
With these words, in striking contrast to the pre-1945 case law,93 
the court confirmed that, despite its restrictive approach to other col-
lectivities, the Jewish citizens of the Federal Republic have become, 
"at least since the special legislation of the National Socialist State ... 
a sharply demarcated group."94 
It has been suggested that the High Court, in addition to recogniz-
ing the Jews as a group, has created a new personal right to the recog-
nition of past persecution of the group, which belongs to every Jewish 
citizen of the Republic whether or not he himself actually suffered per-
secution; and the question was raised at the time whether such a right 
91. See text at note 49 supra. 
92. Judgment of Sept. 18, 1979, 75 BGHZ 160, 161-63. 
93. See text at notes 41-45 supra. 
94. "The fate imposed upon them by National Socialism binds them into a unit which sets 
them off from the generality and is embodied in everyone who belongs to it." 75 BGHZ at 163 
(with citation to earlier opinions). 
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could be claimed by members of other groups such as minorities, refu-
gees, and German expellees from Eastern Europe. We shall see that 
the 1985 law, as interpreted by its legislative history, appears to supply 
an affirmative answer at least in regard to the German expellees.95 
It was the fourth issue, the petitioner's standing, that had deter-
mined the disposal of the case by the appeals court below. That court 
dismissed the complaint because the petitioner was not a Jew and did 
not fall within the circle of the persons "insulted." With this the 
Supreme Court disagreed. It reached the opposite conclusion on the 
basis of a scrutiny of a page-long list of the Nuremberg laws. Accord-
ing to these laws the complainant would be classified as a Mischling of 
the second degree because he had one Jewish grandfather; he thus 
would still have been subject to substantial discrimination. As long as 
the past of the "horrible events" is still present, it is not possible to 
separate individuals from their group. "This may happen only when 
these events become merely a part of the historical process. In the 
Federal Republic such distance does not yet exist."96 
It is, to say the least, somewhat bizarre to see the Supreme Court 
"apply," albeit for this benign purpose, the infamous laws that it had 
excoriated earlier in the very same judgment. It was, as we have seen, 
the appeals court of Celle that subsequently carried this argument to 
its logical conclusion: it acquitted a defendant of a charge of an insult 
because the petitioner was neither a "full Jew" nor a ''Mischling. "91 It 
is therefore not surprising that - as we shall see - in the final phase 
of the legislative process leading to the adoption of the 1985 law, the 
Celle case was invoked in support of the provision that did away with 
95. Professor Edwin Deutsch sees here a new addition to private personal rights such as the 
right to one's own picture, one's own Charakterbild (against unauthorized psychological at· 
tempts), one's own life story. He is concerned about a possible extension of such "privatization." 
Is there a claim for damages for suffering? Can the right be attributed to other groups, such as 
minorities or refugees and expellees? He doubts it. Deutsch, Anmerkung, 33 NJW 1100 (1980); 
see also Judgment of May 8, 1952, BGH, 5 NJW 1183 (1952). 
96. 75 BGHZ at 166. In a 1984 case, however, the Federal Supreme Court indicated that the 
principles enunciated in the above opinion with respect to the denial of the mass murder of the 
Jews would not apply to the denial of other factual situations, such as the setting up of the 
Warsaw ghetto and the shooting of the inmates by the German occupation personnel. The court 
gave no reason for this observation. Judgment of Jan. 27, 1984, BGH, No. StR 866/83, at 4-5. 
In this case the Hamburg Landgericht, relying on the Federal Supreme Court's opinion in 75 
BGHZ 160, see text at notes 88-96 supra, had held that a defense counsel who in his plea in 
another case had argued that the Warsaw ghetto was organized and the order to shoot was given 
by the Germans in an effort to stem a typhus epidemic, was guilty of an insult and of disparaging 
the memory of a decedent. The Federal Supreme Court quashed the conviction for the above 
and several other reasons and remanded for further proceedings. On remand the Hamburg court 
convicted the defendant again of the same crimes but increased the fine from 8100 to 8400 marks. 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Apr. 25, 1986, at 10, col. 5. 
97. See text at note 86 supra; see also Cobler, supra note 15, at 166. 
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the requirement of the private petition and thus authorized ex officio 
prosecution for an insult. 
v. How THE NEW LAW CAME TO PASS 
A. The Original Version: A New Crime 
In September 1982, just two days before its demise, the minority 
Social Democratic government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt submit-
ted a proposal for a new law. As in the case of the 1960 reform, the 
reason given was that "the number of right-extremist, especially neo-
Nazi activities most recently has increased substantially," and there 
was "a gap" in the law that needed to be filled for effective prosecu-
tion. 98 In fact, according to the official statistics the number of re-
ported illegal acts of this type reached a new peak in 1981, having 
increased from 1643 acts in 1980 to 1824 acts in 1981, with threats of 
violence rising by fifty-four percent. The number of violent crimes de-
creased somewhat, due possibly to "resolute prosecution and other 
governmental countermeasures."99 
The government bill envisaged three modifications of the existing 
law. The first two did not bear upon our problem; they proved non-
controversial and were included in the final text. 100 The third change 
would have introduced a new crime of rewarding, approving, denying, 
or minimizing the National Socialist genocide in public statements or 
publications. The then Minister of Justice justified this proposal by 
98. Bundesrat [BR] Drucksache [Dr.] 382/82, Sept. 29, 1982. This reason was recited in all 
subsequent proposals. It was as far back as 1979 that the Social Democratic Minister of Justice 
Hans-Jochen Vogel had called for stronger measures to deal with neo-Nazism and for closing 
legal loopholes. The Week in Germany, Nov. 28, 1979, at 5. See generally Irrungen - Wir-
rungen: Der wechselhafte Gang des Gesetzgebungsverfahrens zum 21. Strafrechtsiinderungsgesetz, 
1985 DEUTSCHE RlCHTERZEITUNG [DRIZ] 225 [hereinafter Der wechselhafte Gang]. 
99. Sixty-six percent of all the right-extremist violations were of the neo-Nazi type; 936 cases 
(721 in 1980) involved smearing, pasting, and posting of placards; antisemitic tendencies were 
found in 323 violations, a rise from 263 in the previous year; there were 42 (49 in 1980) desecra-
tions of Jewish cemeteries or places of worship. The membership in 73 right-extremist groups 
rose slightly from 19,800 to 20,300. The number of periodic publications rose from 85 to 98, 
although their circulation dropped by 1.2% to 324,000. VERFASSUNGSSCHUTZ 1981, at 5, 21, 52 
(Federal Minister of the Interior 1982). The Minister's report for 1982 shows generally identical 
trends, the total of violations rising to 2047. VERFASSUNGSSCHUTZ 1982, at 5 (Federal Minister 
of the Interior 1983). An increase was also reported in left-extremist activities. VERFASSUNGS-
SCHUTZ 1981, supra, at 6, 7. In the 1985 debate, Representative Lowack, a Christian Democrat, 
denied that there was an increase in neo-Nazi activity most recently or that there was a need for a 
new law. He nevertheless said he would vote for the new law as "a symbol of reconciliation." 
Bundestag [BT] 10. Wahlper., 135. Sitz., Apr. 25, 1985, at 10,086. 
100. One of these modifications expanded the existing prohibition on the use and distribution 
of emblems of anti-constitutional organizations to include production, stocking, and import of 
such emblems. (There was at the time a sharp increase of imports of Nazi material from abroad). 
The other change clarified the authority to confiscate left- and right-extremist writings even after 
the brief statute of limitations had precluded criminal prosecution. BR Dr. 382/82, Sept. 29, 
1982, art. 1. 
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the need to provide criminal sanctions for such statements which, 
although eschewing direct hate attacks against the Jews, denied or 
"minimized" their mass extermination "in the guise of apparent objec-
tivity and often with reference to alleged 'proofs.' ,, It was not enough 
that such acts could be prosecuted for insults of individual honor on a 
private petition in accordance with the ruling by the Federal Supreme 
Court; the current provisions on crimes against the public peace 
needed to be expanded to comprise such acts since they endangered 
"the constitutionally guaranteed peaceful coexistence of all citizens 
and the protection of human rights." The new version was to be lim-
ited exclusively to denying the National Socialist genocide. 101 
When the new center-right coalition between the Christian Demo-
cratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Free Dem-
ocratic Party (FDP) took over the government in the fall of 1982, the 
new Federal Minister of Justice Engelhard pressed the bill of his pred-
ecessor in the Bundesrat (Upper Chamber), but that body disapproved 
it. This prompted the Social Democratic Party (SPD) group, this time 
as a part of the opposition, to resubmit the bill.102 
After all pending bills had lapsed with the dissolution of the ninth 
Bundestag (Lower Chamber), the new government presented the same 
bill once more to the Bundesrat in April 1983,103 but that chamber 
reaffirmed its negative posture. 104 In January 1984, it was the Social 
Democratic group that again took the initiative by resubmitting an 
identical bill. 105 The Bundestag gave the bill its first reading on April 
12, 1984, a day after the government transmitted the same text to that 
body. 106 Annexed to the government bill was a statement of the 
Bundesrat opposing the government's proposal on several grounds: it 
did not take into account the views of the administrations of justice of 
the Lander (the component states of the Federal Republic), it was 
vague and constitutionally questionable, and it would turn courts into 
propaganda fora. In its response, which was also attached, the gov-
ernment suggested that a denial of other actions "comparable" to the 
National Socialist genocide might be included in a new article 131. 107 
101. Art. 1(4) in BR Dr. 382/82 would have added a new paragraph to article 140 of the 
Criminal Code. The punishment was to be imprisonment up to one year or a fine. Schmude, 
supra note 8, at 154-55. Article 131 does not apply, since a cruel and inhuman manner of de· 
scription is not present, nor would article 130 cover such acts of mere denial. BR Dr. 382/82, at 
12-14. 
102. BT Dr. 9/2090, Nov. 10, 1982; Der wechse/hafte Gang, supra note 98, at 227. 
103. BR Dr. 158/83, Apr. 8, 1983. 
104. Der wechselhafte Gang, supra note 98, at 227. 
105. BT Dr. 10/891, Jan. 18, 1984. 
106. BT 10. Wahlper., 67. Sitz., Apr. 12, 1984, at 4752-54; BT Dr. 10/1286, Apr. 11, 1984. 
107. BT Dr. 10/1286 (annex 2-3). 
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The Bundestag referred the bill to its Legal Committee. Thereafter it 
disappeared "in the Bermuda Triangle" of the government coali-
tion, 108 to be resurrected in 1985 by the Social Democrats. That group 
placed it on the Bundestag's agenda with the request that the law be 
adopted before the eighth of May of that year, the fortieth anniversary 
date of the final defeat of National Socialist Germany in 1945. 
The Social Democrats and the FDP (liberal party) Minister of Jus-
tice Engelhard were the protagonists of the bill in the ensuing public 
debate. With both the government and the opposition (albeit in re-
versed roles) offering the same bill, one might have expected clear sail-
ing. Only the stance of the Bundesrat and the brief response by the 
government foreshadowed the future imbroglio. 
B. The Publi'c Controversy and a "New" Idea 
The thrust of the criticism of the bill in the legal literature and in 
the press of the day was directed against the idea of establishing a new 
crime. Those who agreed that a gap in the law needed to be filled to 
cope with the serious wrong urged that, instead of creating a new 
crime, the "public peace" articles 130 and 131 should be clarified to 
include unmistakably the "Auschwitz lie."109 On the other hand, 
others felt that only "justiciable facts" should be covered and ques-
tioned the practicality and effectiveness of the proposed text. 110 
Early in February 1985, the bill became entangled in a squabble 
within the governing coalition over internal security policy. At a Ber-
lin conference of legal experts "a deal" was reached according to 
which the CDU/CSU would support the proposed legislation in ex-
change for the FDP liberals accepting, first, a stiffening of an anti-
demonstration law strongly desired by the Christian Democrats and, 
second, a broadening of the proposed new crime to cover the denial 
not only of the National Socialist genocide but "any genocide," includ-
ing the violent expulsion of the German population from Eastern Eu-
rope after 1945. The Bavarian CSU was said to have insisted on the 
second condition. For one reason or another, however - the FDP was 
108. Representative Schmidt (SPD) in BT 10. Wahlper., 67. Sitz., Apr. 12, 1984, at 4754. 
109. Bubnolf, supra note 3. A letter of the Evangelical Church addressed to the President of 
the Bundestag spoke of "an attack on our common existence." Quoted in BT 10. Wahlper., 135. 
Sitz., Apr. 25, 1985, at 10,080. 
110. Eschen, Das 21. Strafrechtsiinderungsgesetz - eine stumpfe Waffe gegen den Rechts-
radikalismus: Stellungnahme des Vorstandes des Republikanischen Anwaltsvereins zum Refer-
entenentwurf eines 21. Strafrechtsiinderungsgesetzes, 16 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR RECHTSPOLmK 10 
(1983) (statement of the board of the Association of Republican Attorneys); Miinchner Merkur, 
quoted in Der Tagesspiegel (Berlin), Feb. 10, 1985, at 2, col. 5. By "justiciable facts" are meant 
perhaps situations that are fit for adjudication by a court, presumably excluding disagreements 
over history. 
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said to have backed away from the bargain - the deal promptly 
collapsed. 111 
During the often-adjourned, ten-week deliberation in the Legal 
Committee of the Bundestag, opposition to the bill mounted. "The 
[government] proposal is harmful in its core. Therefore it will be with-
drawn," declared Mr. Dregger, the leader of the CDU/CSU 
Bundestag group; he added that Chancellor Kohl and his group al-
most unanimously agreed. 112 The head of the CSU, Bavarian Prime 
Minister Strauss, speaking in Tel Aviv, said that no new law was 
needed; the opposition Greens Party and even the Bavarian branch of 
the liberal PDP agreed. 113 On the other hand, the German Federation 
of Judges, the spokesmen for German Jewish groups, and the appar-
ently unanimous Social Democrats voiced their support for the origi-
nal text and opposed with particular emphasis the extension of 
criminal sanctions to the denial of other acts of violence (such as the 
expulsion of Germans) on the ground that it had a "ring of the loath-
some setting-off-against mentality."114 
It was at the insistence of the Social Democrats that a date was 
finally agreed upon for plenary consideration in the Bundestag. At 
this stage Minister Engelhard indicated to the press that although his 
party would "under no circumstances" deviate from the principle of 
an automatic prosecution of the "the Auschwitz lie," it would accept a 
compromise, according to which prosecution would be instituted ex 
officio for an "insult," without the prerequisite of a private petition. 
In that case the idea of a change in the substantive criminal law could 
be dropped. 115 A day before the date set for the Bundestag considera-
tion there was still no agreement within the government coalition. 
111. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Feb. 16, 1985, at 10, col. 2; Der Tagesspiegel, Feb. 20, 
1985, at 8, col. 4; Der Tagesspiegel, Mar. 1, 1985, at 7, col. 1. 
112. Der Tagesspiegel, Mar. 13, 1985, at 6, col. 3. 
113. Der Tagesspiegel, Mar. 1, 1985, at 7, col. 1; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Mar. 2, 
1985, at l, col. 1. In the same vein, see Badische Neueste Nachrichten (Karlsruhe), quoted in 
Der Tagesspiegel, Mar. 9, 1985, at 2, col. 5. For the criticism by the Bundesrat, see text at note 
107 supra. The Greens Party is anti-growth, anti-nuclear, pro-environment. 
114. Chairman Leonardy of the Deutscher Richterbund (German Federation of Judges) on 
the Saar Radio, quoted in Der Tagesspiegel, Mar. 7, 1985, at 2, col. 3 (also quoting the deputy 
lender of the Social Democratic group in the Bundestag, former Justice Minister Schmude); Der 
Tagesspiegel, Mar. 14, 1985, at 2, col. 2 (the chairman of the Jewish Community of Berlin); Der 
Tagesspiegel, Mar. 10, 1985, at 2, col. 5 (Central Council of Jews in Germany); Der Tagesspiegel, 
Mar. 16, 1985, at 2, col. 2. 
115. Der Tagesspiegel, Mar. 14, 1985, at 2, col. 2. The Minister suggested in a later debate 
that this solution was considered under both of his Social Democratic predecessors. BT 10. 
Wahlper., 135. Sitz., Apr. 25, 1985, at 10,081-82. Deputy lender of the Social Democratic group 
Emmerlich declared to the press that the above idea was a "step in the direction" of the SPD 
demand for effective punishment of the "Auschwitz lie." Der Tagesspiegel, Mar. 14, 1985, at 2, 
col. 2. 
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C. The Report of the Legal Committee: A Compromise 
In March 1985, the Social Democrats forced a round of debate on 
the floor of the Bundestag, before the Legal Committee was able to 
agree on a report; but they did not succeed in having the House for-
mally set a deadline for the committee report.116 When this report, 
accompanied by a new government proposal, was finally distributed at 
the end of April, it confirmed that the coalition majority had em-
braced in essence the Engelhard compromise idea described in the pre-
ceding section. 117 
According to the committee majority, the need for a new crime 
provision that motivated the original government proposal had been 
met in the meantime by the decision of the Federal Supreme Court 
sanctioning prosecution for an "insult" pursuant to the current Crimi-
nal Code provisions;118 but since the offended Jewish citizen could not 
be expected to defend himself personally against the insult, possibly 
having to prove that he was Jewish, the requirement of a private peti-
tion should be removed. However, this dispensation should benefit a 
person insulted as a member of a group persecuted not only by the 
National Socialists but also by any "other violent and arbitrary domi-
nance" (Gewalt- und Willkiirherrschaft), a phrase drawn from another 
article of the Criminal Code.119 This, in the majority view, was not an 
attempt "to compare the incomparable"; nor did it evidence a failure 
to recognize "the historical uniqueness of the mass murder perpetrated 
in an organized and technological manner."120 
The Social Democratic member of the committee considered the 
recourse to the "insult" provision inadequate and believed that a spe-
cial crime provision was still necessary, because the denial of the mass 
murder meant "whitewashing the National Socialist regime and thus 
an attack on public peace" through impairment of the "basic consen-
sus of our society." Moreover, since the National Socialist genocide 
was a unique event, any equation with other violence, such as the 
crime of the expulsion of the Germans, must be avoided. In any case, 
there was no need for criminal sanctions against denial of such other 
crimes, because no one denied their existence; they are, in contrast 
116. BT 10. Wahlper., 126. Sitz., Mar. 14, 1985, at 9315-26. The SPD sought to have the 
House express a wish that the committee complete its work by April 25, 1985. Id. at 9326; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Mar. 16, 1985, at 5, col. 4. 
117. BT Dr. 10/3242, Apr. 24, 1985. 
118. See notes 38-40, 88-97 supra and accompanying text. 
119. See STGB art. 194(2). The new text in fact amends article 194(1) & (2). See Appendix 
to this essay. 
120. BT Dr. 10/3242, Apr. 24, 1985, at 8-9. 
310 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:277 
with the National Socialist genocide which is a generally known fact 
and needs no proof, not ·~usticiable." 121 The member of the opposi-
tion Greens Party viewed criminal law as an improper means for com-
batting neo-Nazism; nevertheless, he supported the elimination of the 
private petition. Both opposition groups submitted their views in the 
form of specific legislative proposals.122 
D. The Bundestag Acts 
The emotional debate on the floor of the Bundestag had distinctly 
partisan overtones.123 Speakers from all four parties vied with each 
other in passionate professions of their abhorrence of neo-Nazism, and 
they all conceded that the menace must be met primarily in public 
discourse, in the school, and in the family circle. Beyond this there 
was sharp disagreement. Virtually identical arguments were employed 
and the same positions taken as in the Legal Committee. 
The Social Democrats taunted the government for opposing its 
own original proposal and accused it of procrastination and lack of 
seriousness and sensitivity. With two exceptions, the FDP liberals, led 
by Minister Engelhard, stood solidly behind the government; 124 they 
sought to emphasize their attachment to freedom of opinion and to 
justify their grudging acceptance of the restriction on that freedom. 
The CDU/CSU also closed ranks behind the government, but the 
"young" CDU Representative Lowack refused to believe that there 
had been an increase in neo-Nazi activities and warned that the House 
was being diverted by "a bogey" from more important problems. 125 
The Christian Democratic rapporteur provoked a sharp skirmish with 
the Social Democrats over their alleged opposition, in 1959, to special 
protection for Jews in criminal legislation.126 
The spokesman for the Greens disclosed that a substantial minor-
ity of the group supported the original proposal for a special crime, 
but a majority would settle for the "insult" compromise; the entire 
group, however, was opposed to the juxtaposition of the National So-
cialist persecution with other instances of violence: with such a provi-
sion "no law is better than this law" (quoting the chairman of the 
121. Id. at 9. On ''.justiciable facts," see note 110 supra. 
122. BT Dr. 10/3256, Apr. 24, 1985 (Social Democrats); BT Dr. 10/3255, 10/3260, Apr. 24, 
1985 (Greens). 
123. BT 10. Wahlper., 126. Sitz., Mar. 14, 1985, at 9315-26; 135. Sitz., Apr. 25, 1985, at 
10,075-89; 136. Sitz., Apr. 26, 1985, at 10,122-24. 
124. The FDP exceptions were Frau Dr. Hamm-Briicher, who voted for the SPD proposal, 
and Rep. Schiffer, who abstained. BT 10. Wahlper., 135. Sitz., at 10,086-89. 
125. Id. at 10,086; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Apr. 27, 1985, at 6, col. 4. 
126. Frau Dr. Hellwig, BT 10. Wahlper., 135. Sitz., at 10,076-77. 
November 1986) The Auschwitz Lie 311 
Berlin Jewish Community).121 
In fact, this juxtaposition caused the most acrimonious exchange 
in the chamber. The only dissenter in the government coalition ranks, 
a member of the FDP, declared: 
I am concerned with the political and moral core of this change 
[from the original government bill]. The words "or other violent and 
arbitrary dominance" signify at least indirectly the political intent which 
[former Federal President] Theodor Heuss branded as a "ghastly setting-
off" and which he bluntly rejected as the "behavior of the morally 
empty."12s 
On the other hand, the Christian Democratic leader Dregger was 
moved to interject: "Crimes are crimes by whomever and against 
whomever committed."129 
Chancellor Kohl's speech at Bergen-Belsen, his "promise" to 
Israel, the appeals from the Israeli Parliament, and the positions of the 
Federation of German Judges and of Jewish groups were invoked in 
support of the original bill and against the "juxtaposition." Even the 
controversial "Bitburg visit"130 and the much-discussed reunion of 
former SS men were brought into the debate. The fateful date of May 
8, 1945, was repeatedly mentioned. Both sides signaled a sensitivity to 
the reaction abroad.131 
When it came to voting, the two uncontested items in the govern-
ment's proposal 132 were accepted without opposition. The alternative 
proposals by the Social Democrats and the Greens133 were defeated by 
the coalition majority.134 On the third reading, the entire law as rec-
ommended by the Legal Committee was adopted on a voice vote "by a 
127. Rep. Mann (Greens Party), id. at 10,083. 
128. Id. at 10,087 (Frau Dr. Hamm-Briicher). 
129. BT 10. Wahlper., 126. Sitz., at 9321. Rep. Schmidt (SPD) claimed that the limitation to 
the genocide of Jews was not acceptable to the CDU group particularly because of the opposition 
of the expellees and Rep. Dregger. BT 10. Wahlper., 135. Sitz., at 10,081. 
130. President Reagan's visit to a German military cemetery with, among others, graves of 
some Wajfen-SS men. For the reference to Chancellor Kohl's speech, see BT 10. Wahlper., 135. 
Sitz., at 10,075-76, 10,078. 
131. Rep. Schmidt (SPD), BT 10. Wahlper., 126. Sitz., at 9316; 135. Sitz., at 10,078-79; 
Minister Engelhard (FDP), BT 10. Wahlper., 126. Sitz., at 9320. 
132. See note 100 supra and accompanying text. 
133. See text at notes 121-22 supra. 
134. BT 10. Wahlper., 135. Sitz., at 10,087-92. The SPD modifying proposal was defeated by 
246 votes and 10 (nonvoting) Berlin Representatives (all of the CDU/CSU, all but 2 of the FDP, 
and 18 Greens) against 140 votes and 7 Berlin Representatives (all of the SPD and Dr. Hamm-
Briicher, FDP), with 4 abstentions (3 Greens and one FDP). The proposal of the Greens was 
defeated by 229 and 9 Berlin Representatives against 156 votes and 8 Berlin Representatives, 
with three abstentions. See also Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Apr. 27, 1985, at 6, col. 4. The 
SPD text, BT Dr. 10/891, was also defeated by a majority vote. BT 10. Wahlper., 136. Sitz., at 
10,122. 
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large majority with a number of abstentions."135 It was published on 
June 13, 1985, and came into effect on August 1, 1985.136 
E. The New Law 
The essence of the new law137 is the elimination of the private peti-
tion requirement for insult, if (a) the act is committed by disseminat-
ing or by making publicly accessible a writing, or in an assembly or in 
broadcasting; 138 (b) the insulted party is a member of a group that was 
persecuted "under the National Socialist or another violent and arbi-
trary dominance"; and (c) this group is (at the time of the act) a part 
of the population of the Federal Republic. 139 
According to the Legal Committee, the insulted party, a member 
of the group ("e.g., the Jews or the Silesians") must himself have been 
persecuted because of his membership in the group: 
It is not enough that the group as such was persecuted; rather the in-
sulted party must himself have been exposed to persecution, and that is 
assumed to be so in the case of the Jews who lived within the reach of the 
power of the National Socialist regime and were subjected to the racial 
legislation. 140 
The committee minority questioned the prerequisite of personal perse-
cution on two grounds: first, because the provision will lose any mean-
ing at the latest when there are no longer any directly affected persons 
alive in the Federal Republic; and second, because the courts may be 
misled "unintentionally" to believe that the legislator intended to 
"overrule" the Federal Supreme Court and require a showing of per-
sonal persecution not only under the new law but also in cases insti-
tuted by a private petition under the current law. 141 Indeed, as 
135. BT 10. Wahlper., 136. Sitz., at 10,124. 
136. 1985 BGBI I 965; see also 40 JZ (Gesetzgebungsdienst) 45 {1985). 
137. For the controversial portion of the new law, see the Appendix to this essay. 
138. According to the Legal Committee's report, an insult by a spoken word in private con· 
versation is excluded (e.g., "beertable talk") but can be prosecuted on private petition as before, 
"since it only has meaning for the circle to which it was actually addressed." BT Dr. 10/3242, 
Apr. 24, 1985, at 10. This exclusion is criticized by Ministerialrat Vogelgesang who feels that the 
rationale for removing the prerequisite of a private complaint ("opening old wounds") applies 
equally to an insult in a private circle. Vogelgesang, Die Neuregelung zur sog. "Ausc/11vitzliige" 
- Beitrag zur Bewa1tigung der Vergangenheit oder ''widerliche Aufrechnung"l, 38 NJW 2386, 
2388-89 (1985). "Making publicly accessible" does not require a public place, only a place that is 
accessible to an indeterminate number of persons who are not "personally linked" to the defen· 
dant. An "assembly" consists of any "significant number" of persons, and need not be open to 
the public. BT Dr. 10/3242, at 10. 
139. Foreign groups are excluded. The term "group" is not defined. Cf. STGB art. 220a 
(implementing the United Nations Genocide Convention). The minority in the Legal Committee 
objected that the term could be interpreted as not encompassing resistance fighters or persecuted 
members of political parties. BT Dr. 10/3242, at 10. 
140. BT Dr. 10/3242, at 10. 
141. Id. 
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indicated earlier, the Supreme Court has recognized the standing of a 
Jew living in the Federal Republic to file a petition regardless of 
whether he was personally persecuted or even born after the demise of 
the National Socialist regime.142 Vogelgesang believes, however, that 
what appears to be "a step back" will have limited practical effect, 
since a person who did not suffer personal persecution may find it 
emotionally less difficult to file a petition and thus need not be freed 
from that burden.143 
Still according to the new law, the insulted party who is not inter-
ested in a criminal prosecution is given the procedural right to oppose 
it, but this cannot stop the prosecution with respect to other insulted 
parties.144 One may wonder how - in the absence of a private com-
plainant - the courts will interpret the provision regarding the right 
of opposition to the criminal proceeding.145 A more serious question 
remains: Although the burden of proving Jewish origin is lifted from 
any private party, it will presumably still be necessary for the prosecu-
tor to prove that there are Jewish injured parties, and for the courts to 
determine the fact. Will the courts continue to perform the theater of 
the absurd by employing the Nuremberg racial laws as a yardstick? 
The Federal Supreme Court has fashioned a rationale of a special 
and unique relationship between German Jews and their fellow citi-
zens. It would be interesting to see whether and how the Court will 
construe a similar rationale with respect to other groups whose mem-
bers were persecuted under "another violent and arbitrary 
dominance." 
By avoiding a change in substantive criminal law and by tinkering 
instead with procedure, the legislature conjured up a hybrid: A norm 
originally designed to protect a private good is injected with a new 
public interest, not as strong as the avoidance of a breach of public 
142. Judgment of Sept. 18, 1979, 75 BGHZ 160, 33 NJW 45 (1980); see text at note 92 supra; 
see also judgment of May 8, 1952, BGH, 5 NJW 1183 (1952); Vogelgesang, supra note 138, at 
2389. 
143. Vogelgesang, supra note 138, at 2389. A new provision was also inserted into article 
194(2), which dispenses with the complaint requirement also when a deceased has lost his life as 
a victim of the Nazi or other violent dominance and the insult (disparagement of the memory of 
the deceased) is related to that fact. In that case the insult may be punished ex officio after the 
death of the victim. In other cases specified family members of the deceased have standing to 
lodge a petition. STGB art. 194(2). 
144. STGB art. 194(2). The opposition is final and cannot be withdrawn. 
145. It is clear from the cases discussed above that the statements of the "Auschwitz lie" are 
not directed at any particular person. In theory, at any rate, what will be the outcome if, in a 
prosecution instituted without a private eomplaint, one "insulted person . . . persecuted as a 
member of a group," STGB art. 194(1), objects, but any other such "insulted person," or an 
organization of such persons, or for that matter the prosecutor himself insists that the proceeding 
should take its course? 
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peace but strong enough to turn the offense into an Offizialdelikt,· yet 
the person who suffered impairment of the protected private good is 
given the personal right to stop the ex officio prosecution. Moreover, 
the essentially private-good protection under this provision is granted 
to offensive utterances made in public only. 
It could nevertheless be argued, if one accepts the underlying anal-
ysis of the political and legal context, that this pragmatic patching-up 
has met the need of the day. It is a temporary expedient: when the 
last Jew who lived in Germany during the National Socialist regime 
(or the last Silesian who was expelled from Silesia) dies, things will 
revert to the original state as far as the criminality of the "Auschwitz" 
or other "lies" is concerned. 
VI. A SUMMARY AND Two PERCEPTIONS 
A. The New Law: Pro and Con 
The attitudes toward the new law have ranged from total rejection 
to isolated instances of warm embrace. 
1. The Law Is Bad on Grounds of Principle and Practicality 
Voices opposing "crimes of opinion" (Gesinnungsdelikte) on con-
stitutional grounds are on one end of the spectrum. There is no legal 
duty to tell the truth except where the law so specifies; morality and 
legality are two different categories, and any opinion, regardless of its 
moral color, must be free as long as it does not impair in actual fact 
the freedom of others. 146 Vagueness of terminology exacerbates the 
problem.147 "To declare history a protected legal good means to open 
the door to government despotism under the guise of judicial truth-
finding."148 
Contrary to the official government position, the need for new leg-
islation was questioned particularly in certain CDU/CSU circles, and 
the concern was expressed that the law might lead to a "stream of 
hardly bearable procedures."149 Although the courts have generally 
accepted the genocide of the Jews as a historical fact, what, if any, 
evidentiary procedures will be required to prove "other" acts "of vio-
lent and arbitrary dominance"? 
146. Kohler, Zur Frage der Strajbarkeit des Leugnens von Vo1kermordtaten, 38 NJW 2389, 
2390 (1985); Eschen, supra note 110, at 11. 
147. Ostendorf, Im Streit: Die strafrechtliche Velfo/gung der ''Auschwitzliige," 38 NJW 
1062, 1065 (1985) (pointing to GG art. 103). 
148. Cobler, supra note 15, at 166; see also Leicht, Die Liigner wiirden b/eiben, Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung, Mar. 5, 1985, reprinted in 1985 DRIZ 199. 
149. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Apr. 27, 1985, at 12, col. 1. 
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The experience with the earlier legislation shows, the argument 
continues, that its application at the prosecution, trial, and sentencing 
stages has posed serious problems of effectiveness, practicality, and 
consistency; almost without exception the defendants, young and old, 
remain convinced if not strengthened in their conviction of the truth 
of their allegations; individual as well as general deterrence purposes 
fail, and there is a danger of a "backlash"; the lie is forbidden but liars 
remain. 150 The judicial process is not equipped to carry the burden of 
education that is incumbent upon the family, the school, and political 
discourse, all of which have failed in this area. On the contrary, the 
courts have become a forum for neo-Nazi propaganda that helps make 
new heroes and martyrs for the movement. 151 
2. The Law Does Not Go Far Enough 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are those who deplore the 
"trivialization" and "privatization" of the crime of the "Auschwitz 
lie": instead of reducing it to a mere "insult," the provisions dealing 
with the serious crimes of breach of the public peace should have been 
modified or a new special crime should have been added, as was con-
templated in the original government and SPD bills. The Social Dem-
ocrats, the executive director of the Association of German Judges, 
and the Jewish groups have taken this view (although the idea of a 
modified insult provision is said to have originated earlier in the Cen-
tral Council of Jews). At any rate, court proceedings are important to 
help educate the ignorant, particularly the immature young, and to 
flag the new danger of neo-Nazism. 152 
3. The Law Would Be Good but for the ''Set-off" 
In the "Auschwitz lie" cases, the courts have been reluctant to find 
the necessary prerequisites (breach of the public peace, aggravating 
factors) for finding the serious crimes against human dignity or incite-
ment to race hatred, so that there was a danger - and actual instances 
- of widely criticized acquittals. The Federal Supreme Court ap-
proved the "insult" route; thus, to make it possible to prosecute for an 
insult, without the requirement of a private petition, is the proper solu-
tion to the problem, particularly because it relieves the offended party 
from the burden of proof, including the showing that he is a Jew. 
What makes the law unacceptable, however, is the extension of the 
150. Leicht, supra note 148; Ostendorf, supra note 147, at 1063. 
151. Cobler, supra note 15, at 167-68. 
152. See Marqua, Dennoch: ein schlechter Kompromiss, 1985 DR.IZ 226; text at note 121 
supra. 
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provision to "lies" about acts of "dominance" other than the National 
Socialist genocide - such as the expulsion of German nationals from 
Eastern Europe after 1945, brought about as a result of, and in revenge 
for, the aggression and atrocities committed by the National Socialists 
against the local populations: 
It may indeed ... be a testimony to the deplorable spiritual state of the 
nation and a declaration of the bankruptcy of its public educational insti-
tutions that the act of denying historical truth must be made subject to a 
penalty. But that is the effect of a decade-long cover-up, minimizing the 
terrible crimes and balancing them against others. 
Who actually denies the crimes of expulsion? And what have they in 
common with the factory-type extermination of millions of human be-
ings by the National Socialists? What else lurks behind this demand 
than the terrible mentality of those Germans who, in the manner of chil-
dren caught at mischief, point to "the others" who were "no angels 
either." 
... The inability to acknowledge without any ifs, ands, or buts that a 
unique crime was committed by Germans and to feel ashamed of it will 
also bring a revenge in the future.153 
This was, after some oscillation, the position of the Greens Party. 154 
4. The Law Is Good 
To the extent that a vote on a compromise provides evidence of the 
views of the political parties, the entire government coalition (with 
only two dissents) favored the law as adopted. One official of the exec-
utive branch who welcomed the law added that he would have wanted 
it stiffened to prohibit "Auschwitz lie" statements made in private as 
well as in public (as is the case with ordinary insult) and to increase 
the penalty. 155 He defended the juxtaposition with other acts of 
"dominance" on the ground that other articles in the Criminal Code, 
although enacted with National Socialist actions in mind, are formu-
lated in general terms and do not stipulate a special treatment for such 
actions.156 
153. Comelsen, Schreckliche Aufrechnung, Frankfurter Rundschau, Apr. 18, 1985, reprinted 
in 1985 DRIZ 199. (The Frankfurter Rundschau is a leading left·oriented daily.) 
154. See text at note 127 supra; see also Jung, Strafrechtliche Massnahmen gegen die 
"Auschwitzliige," 26 JURISTISCHE ScHULUNG 80 (1986). Although Prof. Dr. Jung sees some 
good in the "procedural solution," he believes that the inclusion of "other violent and arbitrary 
dominance" makes the principal purpose of the law "relative" and "could be (mis)understood in 
the sense of a 'setting-off-against mentality.' " He sees some difficulty with the requirement that 
the protected group must be part of the population at the time the criminal act occurred; and he 
regrets the loss of the prosecutor's discretion to deny public interest in the matter and refer it to 
the private complaint procedure. Id. at 80-81; see also Boehlich, Wasch mir den Pelz, TITANIC, 
July 1985, at 26 (sharply critical of the new law). 
155. Vogelgesang, supra note 138, at 2388-89. The penalty for insult is imprisonment for up 
to one year (two years "if the insult is committed by a physical act") or a fine. STGB art. 185. 
156. Vogelgesang, supra note 138, at 2388 & n.29. Vogelgesang lists STGB arts. 86, 86a, 90a, 
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A less technical and more eloquent defense comes from a commen-
tator in the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: 157 In this 
clamorous and emotional quarrel no responsible person has suggested 
that the guilt of the National Socialists for the Jewish mass extermina-
tion could be annulled by the reference to the postwar mass crimes 
against the Germans. Those politicians who were accused by the SPD 
of a "setting-off-against mentality" wanted to facilitate, not to avoid, 
the prosecution of the "Auschwitz lie," but they wanted to apply the 
new procedure to the postwar genocide of the Germans as well. For 
the first ten to fifteen years after the war many Germans wanted "to 
push aside" the crimes against the Jews. But this silence changed in 
the early sixties at the latest, due to the important "Auschwitz trial" in 
Frankfurt. "The destruction of Jews has penetrated everybody's con-
sciousness and has remained there." The opposite has occurred with 
the crimes committed against the Germans. These were widely dis-
cussed in the first postwar years, but later on the Germans turned to 
the "new afiluence" and no longer wanted to hear about what had 
happened in the East. In 1969 the government commissioned a study 
of the events in the East but, by a decision of the SPD-FDP govern-
ment in 1974, the resulting massive documentation had been kept 
from the public until the present coalition government lifted the publi-
cation bar. 158 "But there is no way of making up the knowledge gap 
caused by this blackout maneuver." The dreadful atrocities were not 
placed on record in any c'ourt proceedings; the perpetrators were not 
130, 131, 140, 194(2). Article 86, however, does mention specifically National Socialist organiza-
tions. It should be noted that before the new law article 194(2) contained the general clause 
"violent and arbitrary dominance,'' to which the words "National Socialist or another'' were 
added by the new law. See Appendix. 
157. Reissmiiller, Der Betrug mit dem ''Aufrechnen," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 
18, 1985, at 1, col. 5. 
158. See in this context DOKUMENTATION DER VERTREIBUNG DER DEUTSCHEN AUS Osr-
MITIELEUROPA (4 vols.) ('T. Schieder ed. 1953-57) (Federal Ministry for Expellees). The docu-
ments assembled and analyzed by a commission of historians deal with the forcible expulsion 
from the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, Hungary, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. They 
suggest, for instance, that of the more than ten million Germans living east of the Oder-Neisse 
line in 1939, 2.15 million perished as a result of the war and the expulsion, 1.6 million of them in 
the process of expulsion. DIE VERTREIBUNG DER DEUTSCHEN BEVOLKERUNG AUS DEN 
GEBIETEN OsrLICH DER ODER-NEISSE 158-59 E ('T. Schieder ed.) (Vol. I ofDOKUMENTATION 
DER VERTREIBUNG DER DEUTSCHEN AUS Osr-MITIELEUROPA). 
I received the following information from an official source after completion of this manu-
script. "Dokumentation von an Deutschen begangenen Vertreibungsverbrechen" ("Documenta-
tion on Crimes Perpetrated Against Germans in Connection with Their Expulsion") was 
prepared in 1974 for the information of the Federal Government; this documentation has been 
made available at the Federal Archives in Koblenz for use by scholars and publicists; beyond 
that, it is expected that the documentation will shortly become available in bookstores. This will 
in a certain way supplement the documentation prepared by T. Schieder, cited in the first para-
graph of this footnote. Letter from G. Menke (Federal Ministry of the Interior) to Dr. R. Dolzer 
(Mar. 4, 1986). 
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prosecuted but on the contrary were specifically relieved of any legal 
accountability. 159 The mass murders such as the "intentional decima-
tion [of Germans] in Yugoslavia" with clear genocidal characteristics 
must not fall into oblivion any less than the genocide of the Jews. 
The basic argument advanced by this commentator reflects the po-
sition taken by some CDU/CSU participants in the Bundestag de-
bate.160 It may or may not be indicative of things to come that, even 
before the new law had become effective, a sociology professor in 
Mainz is reported to have invoked it against the exhibitors of a Soviet 
film which he claimed "minimized and played down" the acts of vio-
lence committed by the Red Army against thousands of German 
women in 1945.161 
B. The Trend 
At the outset of this essay I suggested that each society must de-
cide for itself where to draw the line between freedom of expression 
and the demands of public order and security for its institutions and 
people. It is not surprising that coping with "the Auschwitz lie" has 
proved to be a particularly arduous task. 
One may recall that another lie - that Germany had lost the First 
World War because of the "stab in the back" at home, rather than 
because of defeat on the battlefield - had served as an important ral-
lying theme for the enemies of the Weimar Republic. The spreading of 
the "Auschwitz lie" is viewed by the authorities as a serious matter. 
An unofficial list compiled by a federal ministry in 1981 shows no less 
than thirty-two books elaborating the false allegations. As mentioned 
earlier, official statistics show a sustained rise in right-wing incidents 
and terrorism, 162 although the current government appears to view the 
threat from the left as more pressing.163 
A public opinion survey commissioned by the Chancellor's office 
in 1979-1980 purported to find that thirteen percent of the electorate 
held on to the National Socialist ideology and a further thirty-seven 
159. See, e.g., the Czechoslovak Law 115, May 8, 1946, providing that acts occurring be-
tween 1938 and 1945, "designed to contribute to the struggle for regaining liberty by the Czechs 
and Slovaks or aimed at a just recompense for the acts of the occupants or their helpers, are not 
illegal even if they would be subject to penalty under the prevailing law." 1946 Sbfrka zakonii a 
nai'fzeni republiky Ceskoslovenske 922. 
160. See especially text at note 129 supra. 
161. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 5, 1985, at 5, col. 5. 
162. See note 99 supra. 
163. In his 1983 annual Report on the Protection of Constitution, the current Minister of the 
Interior, in contrast with his predecessors, deals with left-extremist activities ahead of right· 
extremist actions, devoting 94 pages to the first and 49 pages to the second category. VERFAS· 
SUNGSSCHUTZBERICHT 1983 (Federal Minister of the Interior 1984). 
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percent felt threatened, lost, disoriented, powerless, in the grip of a 
Kulturpessimismus characterized by antipluralist, partly anti-
democratic features, arrogating solely to the German nation, exclud-
ing all others, the "typically German" traits of loyalty, industry, and 
sense of duty. 164 However, both the method and the interpretation of 
the results of this survey have been questioned. Other tests have 
shown on the one hand an impressive growth of public support for 
democratic institutions (seventy-one percent in 1978), and on the 
other hand a rising perception of the National Socialist regime as 
criminal (from fifty-four percent in 1964 to seventy-one percent in 
1978).165 Still another survey prepared for the Ministry of the Interior 
in 1979 identified 4.4 percent of the entire population as showing "left-
protest potential," while only 1.5 percent appeared oriented toward a 
"right-protest potential."166 
The Minister of the Interior concluded in 1982, when the new law 
was first contemplated, that the right-extremist and neo-Nazi groups 
remained isolated and did not enjoy the backing of the population at 
large; they had no chance in elections. He pointed out, however, that 
more than half of the population had grown up after the Second 
World War and had had no first-hand experience of National Socialist 
rule: thus, political education and enlightenment must take on right-
extremist ideas at an early time.167 
There appears to be a consensus in the political arena that criminal 
law must continue to supplement the enlightenment process. The leg-
islature evidently accepts the view expressed by the Federal Supreme 
Court in 1979 that "the past is still present," and that the past events 
have not become as yet "merely a part of the historical process."168 
Between 1982 and 1985, however, owing principally to the shift of 
governmental power from the Social Democrats to the center-right co-
alition, a change occurred in the ideas on how to improve the criminal 
law tools for combatting "the Auschwitz lie." The original proposal 
164. Rechtsextremistische politische Einstellungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and, in 
GEWALT VON RECHTS: BEITRAGE AUS WISSENSCHAFT UND PUBLIZISTIK 207, 210, 218 (Fed-
eral Ministry of the Interior 1982) [hereinafter GEWALT VON RECHTS] (poll by the Sozialwissen-
schaftliches Institut Nowak und Sorge! - SINUS). See in this context the medical profile of the 
defendant before the Frankfurt court, discussed at note 74 supra. 
165. Reumann, Studie iiber Rechtsextremismus - Fallen statt Fragen, in GEWALT VON 
RECHTS, supra note 164, at 221, 222-23 (reporting studies of the Institut fur Demoskopie 
Allensbach). 
166. INFRATEST WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG GMBH, POLITISCHER PROTEST IN DER 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND: BEITRAGE ZUR SOZIALEMPIRISCHEN UNTERSUCHUNG DES 
EXTREMISMUS 19, 20 (1979). 
167. Baum, Vorwort, in GEWALT VON RECHTS, supra note 164, at 5, 5-6. 
168. Judgment of Sept. 18, 1979, 75 BGHZ 160, 166; see text at note 96 supra. 
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of creating a special crime was abandoned in favor of facilitating pros-
ecution for an "insult." The option of a prosecution for more serious 
crimes of breach of the peace under articles 130 or 131 remains, but 
we have noted the reluctance of at least some lower courts to hand 
down convictions for these political crimes. With the passage of time, 
as the past fades from memory, such reluctance is likely to increase, 
particularly in cases of a "simple" version of "the lie" eschewing other 
offensive adornment. The legislative history of the new law may pro-
vide additional encouragement to prosecutors to rely on the "insult" 
route. 169 That route, as we have seen, was opened by the Federal 
Supreme Court170 and widened by the new law. That law, it should be 
kept in mind, at the same time extended the area of a potential re-
straint on freedom of expression by making punishable the denial of 
other "lies." 
C. Two Perceptions 
The lawmaking process - and the new law itself - were directly 
affected by the intense nationwide debate over the implications for 
Germany's present of her 1945 defeat, a debate anticipating the forti-
eth anniversary of Germany's surrender on May 8, 1985. The 
respected Swiss Neue Zurcher Zeitung concluded that overall the de-
bate about the complex "mortgage" left by the Third Reich deserved 
respect because of its openness, intensity, and sobemess.171 
An American observer, on the other hand, saw in this debate "ten-
dencies to rewrite and prettify the past" running "stronger than im-
pulses to recollection and contrition"; themes of Germans as victims 
of Allied bombing and Red Army pillaging were being turned by gov-
ernment spokesmen from a "sense of victimization into a weapon of 
outrage."172 
Like the debate surrounding it, the new law itself, with its contro-
versial clause, may be subject to two perceptions. It may be viewed in 
the first place as an instance of a fatuous compromise dictated by the 
politics of the day, such as occurs from time to time in any working 
democracy, but as a compromise which nonetheless contains positive 
features. The other perception would see the law as a symptom of 
169. The suggestion that articles 130 and 131 be amended to remove any doubt of their 
applicability in this context, see Bubnoff, supra note 3, at 118-20, was not pursued. 
170. 75 BGHZ 160, 161-63; see text at note 92 supra. 
171. Reprinted in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Apr. 27, 1985, at 2, col. 3. 
172. Markham, Bonn's President Seeking to Shift Guilt for Nazis From the Young, Intl. Her-
ald Tribune, June 26, 1985, at 9, col. 1 (referring particularly to the debate over President Rea-
gan's visit to the Bitburg military cemetery). 
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darker currents in the stream of German society. The idea that the 
administered genocide was unique, an unparalleled crime, provided 
the rationale for earlier legislation and judicial decisions; 173 that idea 
has now been jettisoned by the legislator, and with it went - it can be 
argued - an important premise underlying the stance of postwar Ger-
many toward its past. 
It would be a mistake to exaggerate the importance of the legisla-
tion. With the profound changes in the postwar social structure, Ger-
man democracy today appears .secure - at any rate barring an 
economic collapse such as would threaten the stability of any society. 
The holocaust is widely discussed in the mass media, and only a minis-
cule minority questions its reality as a historical fact. Yet the contro-
versy in the Parliament and the adoption of the juxtaposition clause 
reveal an ambiguity regarding the way of dealing with the burden of 
history. 
In an address delivered before the Bundestag on the fateful anni-
versary day, Federal President Richard von Weizsacker stated: "In-
deed, there is hardly a state which in its history always remained free 
of culpable entanglement in war and violence. But the genocide of the 
Jews is without precedent in history." 174 It is open to question 
whether this statement represents today a part of the national 
consensus. 
History abounds with large-scale atrocities, some matching the 
Nazi genocide in number of victims if not in "modus operandi." It is 
axiomatic that as a general proposition "a crime is a crime," and any 
genocide must be recognized as such. The crucial need is for any peo-
ple to recognize their responsibility for a crime committed in pursu-
ance of a policy of their established government. As time and 
generations pass, governments, educators, and other opinion leaders, 
as well as individuals, face a dilemma: To allow the sense of responsi-
bility to vanish from the collective memory would distort history and 
173. In an opinion upholding the seizure of an antisemitic tract, the Federal Supreme Court 
held: 
When the legislature ... expressly and especially protected the prohibition of arbitrary acts 
as a constitutional principle, it proceeded from the experience with the crimes of the Na-
tional Socialist violent and arbitrary dominance .... But it is necessary to counteract even 
the beginnings of such occurrences, before new racial persecutions, in which violence and 
despotism appear under the guise of a law or an administrative act, again poison public life. 
Judgment of Feb. 28, 1959, 13 BGHSt 32, 37; see also 15 BGHZ 160, 161-63. 
174. R. V. WEIZSACKER, ZUM 40. JAHRESTAG DER BEENDIGUNG DES KRIEGES IN EUROPA 
UND DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN GEWALTHERRSCHAFT 4 (Bundeszentrale flir poJitische 
Bildung 1985). See in this context Vice-President Bush: "Our challenge today is to insist that 
time will not become the Nazis' friend ... that time will not fade our sense of the specificity, of 
the uniqueness of the Holocaust ... that time will not lead us to make the Holocaust into an 
abstraction." N.Y. Times, May 11, 1986, at E7, col. 1. 
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would harbor the danger of new excesses. To make people wallow in 
nightmares of guilt so as to impair the self-confidence of the young and 
their positive view of the future might bring about a destructive back-
lash against democratic institutions. The problem is one of a delicate 
balance; there is perhaps a modest role for law and the courts in help-
ing to maintain it. 175 
APPENDIX 
EXCERPTS FROM THE WEST GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE 
Article 130 
Inciting to hatred. Whoever, in a manner apt to breach the pub-
lic peace [public order] attacks the human dignity of others by 
1. inciting to hatred against parts of the population, 
2. provoking to violent or arbitrary acts against them, 
3. insulting, maliciously making them contemptible, or defaming 
them, 
shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of three months to five 
years. 
Article 131 
Representation of violence. Instigating race hatred. 
(1) Whoever 
1. disseminates, 
2. publicly exhibits, posts, presents, or otherwise makes 
accessible, 
3. offers to, leaves with, or makes accessible to a person below the 
age of eighteen, or 
4. produces, subscribes to, supplies, stocks, offers, announces, 
recommends, undertakes to import into, or export out of, the terri-
tory in which this law applies, in order to use them, or pieces de-
rived from them, in the manner indicated in 1 to 3 above, or to 
enable others to do so, 
175. See in this context the current dialogue among German historians and philosophers 
described vividly in Miller, Erasing the Past: Europe's Amnesia About the Holocaust, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 16, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 30, 33. 
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writings (art. 11, para. 3) that incite to race hatred or describe cruel or 
otherwise inhuman acts of violence against humans in a manner which 
glorifies or minimizes such acts of violence or represents the cruel or 
inhuman aspects of the occurrence in a manner offending human dig-
nity, shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of up to one year or 
by a fine. 
(2) The same punishment shall apply to any person who dissemi-
nates a presentation with the contents indicated in paragraph 1 by 
means of broadcasting. 
(3) Paragraphs 1 and 2 are not applicable when the act is in the 
service of reporting on current events or history. 
(4) .... 
Article 185 
Insult. Insult shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of up 
to one year or by a fine, and, if the insult is committed by a physical 
act, by a term of imprisonment of up to two years or by a fine. 
Article 194 
[As amended by the Einundzwanzigstes Strafrechtsiinderungsgesetz 
(Twenty-first Law Modifying the Criminal Law), June 13, 1985.176 
New text is italicized; deleted text is struck through.] 
(1) Prosecution for insult shall be instituted only upon petition. 
When the act is committed by disseminating or by making publicly ac-
cessible a writing (art. 11, para. 3), or in an assembly or by means of a 
broadcasting, a petition is not required, if the insulted person was perse-
cuted as a member of a group under the National Socialist or another 
violent and arbitrary dominance, if the group is a part of the population 
and the insult is connected with such persecution. However, there can 
be no prosecution ex officio if the injured person opposes it. The opposi-
tion may not be withdrawn. If the injured person dies, the right of 
petition and of opposition passes to the next of kin specified in art. 77, 
para. 2. 
(2) If the memory of a decedent is disparaged, the next of kin 
specified in art. 77, para. 2, have the right to lodge a petition. If-the 
deeedent left no persons entitled to lodge a petition or if they died 
before the lapse of the deadline for the petition, no petition is required 
if the deeedent lost his/her life as a victim of a violent and arbitrary 
dominanee and the disparagement is eonneeted with it. If the act is 
committed by disseminating or by making publicly accessible a writing 
176. 1985 BGBI I 965. 
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(art. 11, para. 3), or in an assembly or by means of a broadcasting, a 
petition is not required, if the insulted person was persecuted as a mem-
ber of a group under National Socialist or another violent and arbitrary 
dominance and the disparagement is connected with it. However, there 
can be no prosecution ex officio if the person entitled to lodge a petition 
opposes it. The opposition may not be withdrawn. 
